

JPRS 76467

22 September 1980

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1535



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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INDOCTRINATION: ROLE OF ARMED FORCES DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Col Gen M. Druzhinin, Hero of the Soviet Union: "Our High Duty: The Indoctrinational Role of the Soviet Armed Forces"]

[Text] Military service is a school of life a school of indoctrination.... In continuing the discussion of this subject, the editors intend to publish a series of articles by commanders, political workers, and military scientists on the ways for carrying out the high and responsible task set forward in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological and Political-Indoctrinational Work," that is, to raise the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces. We are inviting the readers to share their thoughts on this important problem.

Twice a year the induction points of the military commissariats receive tens of thousands of Soviet youths for whom the time has come to perform their constitutional duty of serving in the Army or Navy. And of course, military service leaves a profound trace in the awareness of the young citizen of our country, and is visibly reflected in his character, habits and conduct. "The youths arrive in the military family," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress, "without having any schooling in life. But they return from the army already as persons who have passed through the schooling of endurance and discipline, and who have gained technical, professional knowledge and political training."

The indoctrinational role of military service is caused primarily by the very social nature of our army which defends the peace and guards the interests of socialism. And this also explains its powerful effect on the shaping of the soldier's personality.

At the same time, the entire way of army life represents a specific and very active environment for the indoctrination of a person, and it creates all the necessary conditions for an intense and comprehensive effect upon the spiritual world of the young soldiers.

In speaking about the broad possibilities in the area of indoctrinating the youth of the Army and Navy, we, of course, realize that these possibilities still must be realized, and with great effectiveness and considering those problems which confront us at the present stage of military organizational development.

Today's young soldier is involved with automation, electronics, and extremely complex technical devices and systems which have fundamentally altered the nature of military activities and modern combat. Naturally, the inevitable significant intensification of military labor and the greater intellectual, mental, moral and physical stresses pose new, more complicated tasks in the area of indoctrination.

And the problem goes far beyond this. Certainly the present educational level of the youth poses new problems for the indoctrinators. But it is not merely a question of the educational level. More and more noticeably one can see such indications of the spiritual growth of people as extensive political awareness, a cultivated viewpoint, social activeness, and a highly developed feeling of one's own worth....

We also cannot help but consider the fact that in the contemporary world the ideological struggle between the two social systems has become incomparably more acute, and this also raises its own, higher demands upon those who bear responsibility for training the armed defenders of the motherland.

Only considering these problems and only understanding them profoundly can we speak of a new rise in the indoctrination of the Soviet soldier. To increase his political awareness, his class maturity, his feeling of historical responsibility for the security and defense of socialism, to develop in him the qualities of a patriot and internationalist, and see to it that the knowledge acquired by him is unfailingly turned into firm convictions, into an active position in life, and into a guide for action--this is the main content of political indoctrination and party work. And unconditionally we must not be content with the achieved level at present, and we must bring all our indoctrinational activities into agreement with the more complicated tasks. In essence, we are obliged to do this by the Decree of the Party Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological, Political and Indoctrinational Work." In this document we find the indications of those paths which we must follow. To strengthen the indoctrinational role of the Armed Forces as a whole means to strengthen it in every platoon, in every company, regiment, ship and formation.... This is the high duty of each and everyone who has dedicated himself to the military profession. And precisely each of us!

To provide a unity of organizational and political work in all areas and on all levels, to permeate military training, the socialist competition and all aspects of diverse Army and Navy life with a political influence, to always anticipate the indoctrinational possibilities and consequences of any administrative measures--this is one of the most important ways in our struggle to further raise the indoctrinational role of the Armed Forces.

Let us ask ourselves: Is there, for example, in a regiment even one regular military man who could have justification in saying that he is removed from indoctrinational problems? There are no such persons. And there cannot be. Because each person in the job assigned to him must maintain a situation and create an environment which in and of itself indoctrinates a person.

How many services, how many officials, for example, are involved in organizing and supporting the process of military training? Just one has to commit negligence or idleness, and we immediately bear the indoctrinational losses with the others. Because a poor organization of the question gives rise to unnecessary tension and nervousness, and deflates people.

There is no need, I feel, to show particularly what a dear price is paid for each deviation from the organization of military training and the routine of the men strictly according to the regulations, or any rash decision by a commander or political worker. Sometimes one is amazed how this can be a respectable person, a communist, who has control over people, and cannot (or even not want) to anticipate even one step ahead or how his decisions or actions may be reflected in the awareness of the men.

Once we happened to be the involuntary witness of the following scene. A captain, as it later turned out, a company commander, dissatisfied with the bearing of the young soldiers, halted the formation. The soldiers were returning after dinner from the mess. Initially for about 20 minutes, to put it simply, he dressed them down. Then for about the same period of time he forced them to march on the parade grounds. We had to intervene. He said that he was "indoctrinating."

Here are your "methods" of the commander as the indoctrinator. He, it turns out, was convinced that he was engaged in establishing proper order. And at the same time he was acting not in the spirit of the regulations but merely instilled dissatisfaction and bitterness in the men, that is, he arrived as a result which was directly opposite to the one he was after.

In such instances we would say that the party organization, the party committee and the political department has serious reason to reflect on whether a profound and organic unity has been achieved on all levels in the organizational and indoctrinational efforts, and whether each officer understands the importance of this demand and the necessity of following it unswervingly.

The party points out that the main efforts in developing ideological indoctrination should be focused in the labor collective where, in the expression of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "the great concepts of policy and economics are translated into the language of practice, and where people largely develop their attitude toward life and toward society."

It is impossible to read without being moved the numerous letters which are received by commanders and political workers from their former subordinates.

"I at present myself am leading a brigade," writes the Jr Sgt (Res) Mikhail Zvyagintsev. "I can say that from my own experience I have realized how important it is to create a situation in the collective where it is difficult for egoists and weaklings to survive and that only our cause--frank, strong and honest--gains the upper hand. I always tell the fellows that this was how it was in our battalion...."

This means that in the military collective where the author of the letter served, they succeeded in creating a healthy situation which inspired a person and caused him to grow ideologically and morally.

This is why the decree of the CPSU Central Committee obliges us to assess the work of the military cadres not only in terms of the indicators for carrying out the plans for military and political training, but also see what the level of discipline is here and how the moral and political climate has developed in the collective. Without having any notion of this, it is impossible to draw any conclusion about the effectiveness of indoctrinational work in the subunit, regiment, or ship. And something else is equally apparent. The political, moral health of the collective and its solidarity depend directly upon the militancy of the party organization.

To be the center of ideological and moral indoctrination--this is the fighting task which the party has posed for its organizations. And the better our party organizations carry out this task, the more tangible becomes their aid to the commanders, and the more noticeable the party spirit permeates all the life of the collective. It is quite obvious that this also raises the role of the Komsomol organizations in indoctrinating the young soldiers.

Party work is primarily work with people. This has always been the case, and it is all the more important to understand this now. And if people are frank and optimistic, if they speak ardently and with interest about things, this is already a reliable indication that at the commander is on top of things here, the party organization is truly a militant one, and political indoctrination has been well organized.

I have often encountered commanders and political workers who strain themselves to the utmost in order to show things in the best light. In their understanding, all political indoctrination should be faced toward the superior command. But when you look at the other side carefully, the side facing the object of indoctrination, the men, then very often one finds the worst bureaucratic red tape. We must decisively break with such camouflage. Formalism is the worst enemy of ideological indoctrination. And it, unfortunately, is still alive and flourishing.

To strengthen the indoctrinational role of the Armed Forces is a task of great political importance. Clearly, its solution is of a comprehensive nature. And here particular significance is assumed by the personality of the leader who is the key figure in ensuring an effective indoctrinational process.

The party aims at raising the responsibility of the leading cadres for the organizing of all indoctrination and at their active involvement in political indoctrination and particularly in daily individual work with the men. The leader should set the tone in the struggle to improve the entire indoctrinational climate in the collective, and show an interest in having the men live a full, spiritual life, and each communist actually be an ideological fighter. The leader cannot help but see that without improving the theoretical and practical skills of the indoctrinators the quality and effectiveness of the political exercises, the organization of the socialist competition, lecture propaganda and political agitation cannot be raised, and the effectiveness of individual work improved.

In speaking of the place and importance of the leader in the overall solution to these questions, we cannot help but emphasize the particular importance of his moral example for subordinates. These include personal discipline, inner control, culture, an irreproachable attitude toward the execution of service duties, constant concern for subordinates and respect for man.

Seemingly everything here would be perfectly clear. But, no matter how strange it may seem, sometimes an officer who holds a high position must be reminded about the most elementary rules of military ethics.

It must be explained that regardless of all their severity, the laws of military service establish relationships whereby the superior and the subordinate are persons, although on different levels of the service ladder, who should show each other the mutual respect of persons who are equally engaged in a common cause. To put it figuratively, we are all in the same trench, and are all linked together by the single aim of serving the motherland and defending it with weapons in hand.

At times an effort is made to write off dubious methods of indoctrination or rather an attitude toward them as a question of inexperience. We can scarcely agree with this. Inexperience has different mistakes, and they are less troublesome. But indifference, roughness and disrespect are the poisonous fruits of moral immaturity. And here a respectful age and length of service merely aggravate the situation.

Strict exactingness has never shaken the authority of a superior in the eyes of subordinates if it is dictated by a sincere concern for the question or if it is inseparable with concern for man. I remember how we were a little afraid of the sharp temper of our regimental commander, Vasilii Andreyevich Trushin, but for us he remained our "father" for all our lives. But then, on the front, confronted with the urgent necessity of sending men to their death, he seemingly might not delve so deeply into the details of a soldier's life. But he did delve because here he did not recognize any "minor details."

Twice a year the recruits arrive in the troop unit or on the ship. And twice a year, tens of thousands of young citizens of our country, having

undergone the schooling of military service, return to the ranks of the builders of communism. What an enormous responsibility rests upon the regular personnel of the Army and Navy!

To indoctrinate the Soviet soldier as ideologically convinced, morally and physically conditioned, courageous, disciplined, and capable of heroic feats for the sake of the socialist fatherland--this is a question of conscience for each regular military man. This is our high duty.

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CSO: 1801

SCIENTIFIC METHODS: MILITARY APPLICATIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Guards Engr-Col A. Anashechev: "An Engineering Decision"]

[Text] The name of this title has been suggested by readers. In letters to the editors and in the course of reader conferences requests were constantly voiced to hear more often about the creative use of the recommendations of modern science in the daily practical activities of the commanders, political workers, engineers and other military specialists, and about the specific experience of applying scientific principles in the command of the units and subunits, and in solving other problems of military training.

Today we are beginning publication of materials on the designated problems.

Scientific and technical progress has introduced a mass of new terms into our daily parlance. Such concepts as an automatic control system, mathematical modeling, systems engineering, operations research, and so forth have become customary. At present you will scarcely find a person who would dare deny all the importance of the content concealed in them. The necessity of a scientific approach to solving the most diverse problems is recognized by everyone. Some, unfortunately, only in words. But in practice? Here at times the opinion is still found that the use of all these scientific achievements is a question only for the large scientific centers and academies where a large contingent of scientists is employed and complicated questions are solved. But in the troops, supposedly, in operating the military equipment, one can speak only hypothetically about the use of modern methods, for example, of control science.

In my view, this is a profound and rather harmful confusion. And it is harmful in the fact that the specialist who uses scientific terms (and even science itself) "only hypothetically" or more accurately, formally, would soon abandon them generally as unnecessary. The misfortune is that along

with the terms one discards what stands behind them, that is, a scientific methodology and a scientific approach. In the actions of such a specialist there is a predominance of naked intuition, and hence, the decision and its execution also lose effectiveness. The entire process of control in the given instance often comes down to a very simple formula: "I have given the instruction."

Of course, control by the method of giving individual instructions cannot be effective for one forgets the underlying triad of systems engineering: "Aim--means--control." One could say a great deal about how the "separation of goals," that is, an insufficiently clear understanding of the overall task, reduces the effective interaction of various services. Or how the most correct goal is not attained when insufficient attention is given to ensuring the means for attaining it. Or of the pernicious influence of the absence of proper constant control over execution. But all of this, obviously, is a question of separate discussions.

At present I would like to show how we in our daily activities as operating engineers in one way or another must employ scientific methods. Life simply forces us. But the person who does this consciously achieves more with less expenditures.

For example, how do we approach the taking of our engineering decision? A decision which is expected from us by the commander and which, being approved by him, gains the force of an order, or becomes, in using the language of cybernetics, a control signal? As an example, let us take the complicated and rather often encountered problem of the ferrying of a group of aircraft to another airfield. For this there are a number of instructions, tables, schedules and so forth making it possible to calculate the demand for the means of transport, fuel, for compiling the plan of actions for the various services at one's own and intermediate airfields, as well as at the destination airfield. Any engineer begins his work by carrying out the calculations which are mathematical modeling. And the requirements of the guiding documents here should be carried out unfailingly. For all of them are nothing more than generalized experience and without using such a truly scientific approach is inconceivable.

Now the calculations have been made and tested, and the best variation for the given criterion has been selected. The decision can be given to the commander. Formally the engineer has performed his functional duties. But now, in my view, occurs the moment when the true organizational maturity of a specialist and his capacity to think in a scientific manner are established.

The engineer should realize that a theoretical calculation is still far from practice, and that it represents a mathematical model which because of its very specific features cannot consider all the complexities in the development of the situation. To put it simply: something may be too large to fit in the cabin of the air transport, an essential tie-down fitting may be missing somewhere, someone will hinder someone else in his job by not

sleeping in the debilitated state, or someone merely confused or forgets something. And each of these "details" is capable of disrupting the brilliantly conceived scheme.

What is the solution? Science provides a completely definite answer to this question. It is essential to resort to full-scale modeling and to the training of the personnel. In other words, "to play through" the future situation ahead of time. And not merely to play through, but rather to do this under different situations and with various unannounced changes.

I once happened to observe the following picture. At one of the airfields, they were making a "dry run." All the personnel divided into groups, under the command of superiors, was formed up, assigned out, and assembled before canvas-covered boxes. The men were carrying some loads and placed them in a frame the dimensions of which previously imitated the cargo cabin of a military transport. Specially assigned officers were watching the course of the work with stopwatches in hand. The results of the timing were entered in notebooks, and then the entries were collated for the person in charge of the support for the future flight, and he, in turn, made corrections in the previously elaborated scheme. In a word, full-scale modeling was in progress.

All the participants of the "game" showed a completely serious attitude toward it, with the exception of the commander of one of the rear subunits. To the complaints voiced to him, he retorted: "Why do we need to rehearse, everything is clear to us, and we will perform as we should. But now people are involved in something more important." The day of the flight arrived. Everything was occurring according to the plan. But all of a sudden a hitch and trouble. The designated ill-fated subunit managed to get in not their own helicopter but rather the one assigned for transporting the technical crews which would support the take-off from the intermediate airfield. One can imagine how everything would have ended if completely different services ended up by the combat aircraft instead of technicians and mechanics, or if there had not been the prompt intervention by the command.

You might say this is an ordinary snafu. Yes, but also the instructions to conduct the training session in essence were not carried out. But the reason was something different, that is, the failure to understand the necessity and effectiveness of employing scientific methods in organizing the leadership of the personnel. The mentioned officer obviously did not fully understand that these methods are not someone's whim or the desire to be fashionable, but are based on objective laws. Certainly if he had troubled himself to understand the relationship between the psychology of military labor and neurophysiology, he would have realized that up to 90 percent of all information serving as the basis of the program for our conduct under one or another situation is gained by us not through our conscience, and not in the form of logical relationships (represented by the guiding documents such as orders, manuals, instructions and so forth) but through the

subconscious and through emotions. Actions are formed only in the process of actions under conditions which are maximally close to real ones, that is, during training. Here people in the groups "interact" with one another, and involuntarily in one's memory is formed the positioning of the cargo, the aircraft, and the personnel in the various segments of time, and the sequence of actions. Here automatic actions are being developed.

In the present VUZ programs there are scores of various disciplines. Among them also is game theory and mathematical statistics, operations research and mathematical modeling. But still the graduates gain the main science, the science of controlling personnel and equipment, in the troops. The results of their activities are determined by how organically they are able to introduce the obtained knowledge into practice and make science an instrument of their daily work.

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OFFICER CANDIDATES: SELECTION PROCESS DISCUSSED

Maxim KOPANAYA SPEAKS In Russian 6 Apr 60 p 1

[Editorial: "Worthy Persons for Military Schools"]

[Text] The Communist Party and the Soviet government have shown constant concern for the training of ideologically tempered and highly qualified officer personnel. At present a predominant majority of the military schools is higher ones. They are staffed by experienced commanders, political workers, and instructors, and possess a modern educational plant. This helps to raise the level of the educational and indoctrinational process, and helps the officer candidates in successfully mastering the political, military and special knowledge, and in firmly acquiring sound practical skills which will be essential for the successful carrying out of their service duties in the troops.

The training level of the future commanders, political workers, military engineers and technicians depends largely upon the quality of selecting candidates for admission to the military schools. At present, when preparations are underway in the troops to hold the training courses for regular military personnel who have stated a desire to be admitted to the schools and the military commissariats are accepting applications from the civilian youth, concern for the quality of the new officer candidate ranks should be at the center of attention of the officials concerned with this. The worthiest and the best are to be chosen from among the thousands of soldiers, sailors, sergeants, the working youth, the students of schools, vocational-technical schools and technical schools who have stated their desire to become officers and to acquire a profession which has the affection and respect of the people.

The persons admitted to the schools should possess good general educational preparation, they should be physically strong and have high moral qualities. It is equally important that a young man who has decided to dedicate his life to serving in the Army and Navy realizes the difficulties he can encounter on his chosen path, and what responsibility rests on his shoulders after completing a military school.

For precisely this reason, the work of selecting the candidates for the military schools which is presently being carried out by the commanders, the political workers, the personnel bodies and the military commissariats is of primary significance. To a decisive degree who will be admitted to the military schools and what sort of recruits they will receive depend upon the quality of this work.

As a rule, such work is carried out on the spot rather precisely and in an organized manner. The question has been well organized in the Leningrad and Northern Caucasus military districts. Unfortunately, there still are shortcomings. For example, last year individual commanders prevented the admission of servicemen to the schools if the latter belonged to a different service of the Armed Forces or branch of troops. In certain units under the most diverse pretexts, class specialists and outstanding men in military and political training were not included among the applicants, and a majority of them undoubtedly could have been good officer candidates and subsequently officers. Both in the troops and in the military commissariats there were instances of a formal approach to the selection of candidates, and a superficial preliminary medical certification of them. We have still not eliminated instances of the incorrect or negligent drawing up and late sending out of documents to the proper authorities, or the delayed departure of candidates for the military schools for taking the entrance examinations.

All measures must be taken to prevent such shortcomings now.

In the course of selecting the candidates for the military schools, the commanders, political workers and staff officers must objectively assess the political, professional and moral qualities of those soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers who have voiced a desire to be admitted to a military school, they must establish whether or not they have taken this decision seriously and thoughtfully, and help, if need be, in finally selecting the military specialty and the specific military school. Concern must also be shown for creating favorable conditions for preparing the servicemen in regular service for the forthcoming examinations. Each of them must be given an opportunity to attend training courses. Practice has shown that such courses provide a maximum effect in the instance when they are held in large garrisons, where experienced instructors can be involved in the exercises with the troops.

Responsible tasks also confront the military commissariats. Their co-workers must give maximum attention to each submitted application, in close contact with the Komsomol bodies they must thoroughly and profoundly study the political and professional qualities of the candidates, and must objectively assess them, considering both the results achieved in training as well as the social activities of the applicant, his relationships in the collective, discipline and moral make-up. It is essential to help each of them in choosing the military school which would best conform to his desires and real capabilities. The organizing of meetings with representatives of the military schools, special subject evening meetings, and regular

Participation in the work of the commissions will contribute to the high-quality selection of candidates for the schools. The military commissariats can and should be substantially aided by the activists of the Komsomol organizations, the military instructors, and the Army and Navy veterans.

Complex and responsible tasks also must be solved by the admission commissions of the military schools. Their membership should include the most experienced commanders, political workers and instructors. In studying the received personal files and in reporting to the school head their considerations on the advisability of admitting one or another candidate to the entrance examinations, the members of the admissions commissions must show maximum objectivity and loyalty to party principles. The admissions commissions should show concern for creating a professional and helpful situation in the period of holding the examinations. In giving the results, in analyzing and comparing the results, and in taking a decision to admit or reject any of the candidates, the commissions must strictly and unwaveringly follow the current rules for admission to military schools of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Admission to military schools is an important and responsible task. In all its stages this work must be carried out in such a manner that the best representatives of the Soviet youth, the worthy heirs of the military glory of the older generations who are capable of justifying the high title of a Soviet officer are among the officer candidates.

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OFFICERS' POLITICAL TRAINING: SHORTCOMINGS NOTED

Moscow KHASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Apr 60 p 2

[Article by Lt Col N. Peslov, chief of the University of Marxism-Leninism at the Kiev District Officer Club: "When There is No Control"]

[Text] Maj S. Chernousov and V. Vyreshchikov were expelled from the University of Marxism-Leninism for systematic absences. The party organization secretary Lt Col G. Shichin petitioned actively for their reinstatement. He assured us that now he would take the training of the communists under constant control.... We believed him and accepted his request. Some time has already passed, but the officers have neither attended nor do attend many exercises. And here I would like to recall one characteristic episode. Even before the talk with the secretary, I had shown Maj S. Chernousov copies from letters in which the leadership of the university each month notified the commanders, political departments and the party organizations of the troop units and military schools of how their people were studying. The major shrugged his shoulders as no one had spoken with him about his studies. As they say, no commentary is required.

Of course, we realize that many of the students who have missed exercises do this for valid reasons. The officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"] leave for official missions, they go into the field for tactical exercises and prepare for inspections. But the striking thing is that in the collectives where proper control has been instituted over the studies of the communists in the university, the influence of the so-called "objective" factors has been minimized. Let me mention the Kiev Higher Tank Engineer School imeni Mar SU I. I. Yukobovskiy. The representatives of this institution of learning attend the exercises scrupulously and study assiduously. The university is constantly visited by workers from the school political department who are concerned with the successes of their fellow servicemen. The tone is set by the chief of the political body Maj Gen A. Koval'. He is our frequent guest, without fail he talks with his officers, he investigates carefully the reasons for absences and seeks to eliminate them.

But in the Kiev Higher Antiaircraft Missile Engineer School imeni S. M. Kirov, control is exercised quite one-sidedly. If a student of the

University of Marxism-Leninism has passed all the exams. It seems to be learning. Recently one of our instructors complained about Lt. S. Dyukovskiy, an officer from this school who had missed many exercises but nevertheless showed available "activity" to pass the exams without fail, since he had to "excel" in service.

Here, in our view, is to be found the very essential reason for the formal attitude on the part of certain leaders to the study of their subordinates in the university. Let us compare today's student body with what it was, for example, 15-20 years ago. At present a majority of the officers has completed the higher military schools, and the general educational level of the warrant officers and civilian employees of the Soviet Army has increased noticeably. With some effort it is not so difficult for a student to pass the examinations even if he may miss lectures and seminars.

But what are the grades? A three [average], all the time balancing on the edge of knowledge and ignorance. In essence, the reason is lost for the student's exercises in the university, that is, a higher form of party training making it possible to deepen and broaden his theoretical knowledge and apply it skillfully in practice. Here I am not speaking about the mastery of the principles of party political work which are so essential for a young officer. Understandably, all of this cannot be assimilated by an evening of cramming, but rather there must be systematic, careful and creative work with oneself, and an active participation in discussions at seminars. But sometimes there is a paradox. An officer is enrolled in the university so that he can improve in his ideological and theoretical education, but the person does not use the opportunities granted him. Released from study in the group of Marxist-Leninist training, he does not attend the exercises at the university and in fact studies nowhere.

Certainly we try to prevent this. We take organizational measures for this. As has already been said, each month we send out informative letters to the troop collectives in which we analyze the course of studies of the students and their attendance of the exercises. Often we ourselves travel to the units and have a talk with the commanders, political workers and secretaries of the party organizations. On the other hand, we are raising in every way possible the demands placed upon the grading of our students' knowledge. At a session of the educational council, a decision was taken not to accept exams from those comrades who do not have outlines of the primary sources and the other recommended literature. Instructors who have been too liberal are seriously criticized. We also condemn the style of those instructors who do not shy away from hurried exams, and this of course does not help in objectively evaluating the knowledge of the students.

But no matter how we increase the demands, without the active support from the commanders, and without control over the studies of the students by the party committees and bureaus, it is impossible to successfully organize the educational process as a whole. In the same Kiev Higher Tank Engineer School, they make it a practice to have the communists give reports on their studies, and the members of the party bureaus personally supervise the

Independent work of the officers with the primary sources. They take an interest in how thoroughly a person has assimilated the knowledge acquired by him in the university, and how he applies this in his practical activities.

The latter is very essential. The studies in the university give the students an opportunity to speak before the personnel. A considerate leader such as Lt Col Ya. Shcherbak, for example, is constantly interested in what assignment the subordinate has been given, he provides advice on what report or abstract to give for one or another audience, and how the control coursework should be used here. Experience shows that the person who studies conscientiously in the university more often speaks before the personnel giving lectures and reports, and in one manner or the other is involved in organizing party political work in the unit or subunit. At one time I took an interest in how the secretary of one of the party organizations viewed the service of our student Lt Col R. Gataullin. In reply I heard that this officer carried out all orders in an exemplary manner and took an active part in indoctrinating the personnel. And at the same time, regardless of his heavy workload and official trips, he never missed a single exercise without a valid reason, and prepared seriously for each seminar. And his speeches excelled in breadth and wisdom. According to the general opinion of the instructors, the comment "present" for him was always the equivalent to a high grade.

On the other hand, certain other students as Capt P. Brayon and A. Shamro who missed exercises more than the others rarely speak in front of their subordinates and virtually take no part in the agitation and propaganda work.

Control over the studies of the students should not be reduced merely to making certain whether the officers and warrant officers released from duty attend the university. There would be no essential benefit from such observations. It is essential to organize the help and control in such a manner that the student feels a vital need for continuously increasing his knowledge, that he apply this knowledge in practice, and that he pass on his own ideological conviction to others and thereby influence the results of combat training. The CPSU Central Committee in its Decree "On Further Improving Ideological, Political-Indoctrination Work" has posed the question precisely with this practical focus, in speaking of the need to raise the level of political studies.

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CSO: 1801

CARPATHIAN M.D. COMMANDER ON TROOP INDOCTRINATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Col Gen V. Belikov, commander of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "The Instilling of Exactingness"]

[Text] Anyone who visits the regiment under the command of Lt Col V. Tereshchenko cannot help but note the exemplary order and the smartness of the personnel. This is everywhere: on the territory of the unit, in the barracks, in the classrooms, at the motor park, and on the tactical training field the motorized rifle troops look smart. In the regiment they strictly observe the daily regimen and the schedule of exercises. Generally speaking this is quite natural. This is how it should be in a troop unit. However, all of this does not come about spontaneously. A great deal depends upon the regimental commander and the other officers. What is the most characteristic feature in the style of their work?

If one speaks about the main thing in the activities of Lt Col Tereshchenko, one must probably mention first of all the constant and strict exactingness of the officer shown for himself and for his subordinates. This quality of the commander was immediately apparent upon arriving in the regiment. The daily exactingness combined with painstaking indoctrinational work aimed at improving the quality and effectiveness of combat training made it possible for Lt Col Tereshchenko to win authority in the collective and bring about a rise in combat readiness. Now the regiment headed by him is the best in the division for all indicators.

It would be possible to give many other examples affirming the truth that just and proper exactingness on the part of a commander is a most important factor in the effectiveness of his work.

But is this not simple, that is, to be exacting? Do we not at times forget that it is important not only to give an order to a subordinate, but to influence him in such a manner that he, as they say, with both heart and mind perceives the necessity of what is demanded from him. Actually, here lies the very essence. The conscious nature of our military discipline presumes also an appropriate style of work from the commander. It is not enough to

merely command. It is also essential to be able to influence the thoughts and feelings of the men. Here a profound knowledge of the principles of military pedagogy and psychology is essential. Unfortunately, certain officers lack precisely this.

Individual commanders at times show, I would say, a moral deafness, and do not endeavor to delve deeply into the "technology" of relationships with subordinates. As a result an opportunity is missed to create an atmosphere in the military collective of reciprocal exactingness, respect and true military comradeship. Let me illustrate this from an example.

At one time, not everything was going well with discipline among the subordinates of Maj D. Denishenko. Many were surprised by this as in the unit Maj Denishenko was known as an exacting officer. However, with a more thorough study of the state of affairs, it turned out that the officer could flare up at any pretext and punish a subordinate, as they say, out of hand. And here often he did not mince words. The commander's callousness, his unchallengeable judgments, and disregard of the experience and opinion of subordinates strained the situation in the collective to a maximum.

As we see, in his work the officer did not consider the well-known truth that the strength of a commander lies in a spiritual solidarity and like-thinking with subordinates. Quick-fire judgments of them and particularly a lack of tact in dealing with them have nothing in common with the true exactingness of a commander. The high general educational and cultural level of the Soviet military and a feeling of their own worth which is instilled in them by the entire way of our life and by the entire organization of army service make such phenomenon unacceptable. The style of work of a true military leader, as L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his book "Malaya Zemlya" [Little Earth], is characterized not by a harshness of orders, but above all by the ability to create the necessary conditions which make the order feasible, and by a respectful and sincere attitude toward the men. A good knowledge of subordinates by the commander, the ability to understand their thoughts, feelings, moods, needs and requests, and pedagogical tact--these are indispensable conditions for achieving success in the training and indoctrination of the personnel.

At the same time I would like to emphasize that the closeness of the commander to his subordinates and constant contact with them in no way mean that he should show any sort of leniency for those who do not always act as is required by the laws of military service. Mutual respect and confidence should be based upon mutual exactingness. I draw attention to this again because commanders are still encountered who instead of demanding that a subordinate serve according to the regulations begin to persuade or remonstrate with him, and so forth. Here at times one hears that unswerving exactingness is required, supposedly, only in a combat situation. This is wrong! The experience of the Great Patriotic War has taught us that only a soldier will act skillfully and decisively in combat when he has undergone good training under conditions close to combat and is indoctrinated in a spirit of unswerving execution of orders and strict discipline. And here,

naturally, the exactingness of a commander is indispensable. Leniency for shortcomings in combat training or in discipline and the exactingness of a commander are incompatible concepts.

Our party, in showing constant concern for the strengthening of the combat might of the Army and Navy, has focused the military personnel on increasing exactingness in the struggle to further strengthen military discipline, order and organization, and in raising the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces.

And the following practices are still encountered. In the presence of a senior chief or inspectors an officer looks exacting and does not tolerate the slightest deviations in the conduct of subordinates from the established rules. But as soon as the inspector leaves, the commander's exactingness begins to wane. Now the officer does not notice the so-called minor infractions of discipline. There must be a decisive struggle against such sham exactingness, for such an approach in no way helps to develop the habits and skills of disciplined conduct in the men.

Also encountered is the shortcoming of haziness and a lack of concreteness in the orders and instructions of a commander. Before demanding something, make certain that the order given by you can be carried out in the assigned time, and that the executor has sufficient forces, knowledge and experience for this. Unsound orders merely undermine the moral strength of exactingness. Here one must particularly stress the importance of the competence of the leader and his profound knowledge of all aspects of combat training, the service and life of the men.

At times it is pointed out that a commander demands, convinces but there is little result. It can be concluded that the officer does not have sufficient authority among the personnel.

The success of leadership, V. I. Lenin teaches, is achieved not only by the power of authority, but also by the strength of influence and by the strength of the prestige of its representatives. This Leninist thought is particularly timely for us.

For example, I know the great prestige which Lt Col V. Yegorov has among his subordinates. He has won this by a profound knowledge of all the questions of organizing military and political training, the socialist competition and service, by outstanding skills, and, of course, by his commander's exactingness.

The following episode comes to mind. The tank company under the command of Sr Lt V. Kochetygov had received a poor grade in gunnery training. At that time there were many rebukes addressed against the young officer. They demanded that he eliminate his shortcomings. But things did not straighten up and the senior lieutenant had begun to lose heart. Then Lt Col Yegorov attended the exercises of the tank troops. Along with the company commander,

he calmly analysed the methods of his work. And the conclusion he drew was a promising one. The senior lieutenant had good training in tactical terms, he knew the equipment, was a good gunner, but could not organize the exercises correctly as he lacked experience. The lieutenant colonel began to patiently instruct the company commander in advanced methods. The course of combat training in the subunit was taken under his special supervision. A little time passed and the situation improved in the company.

This episode is instructive also as it illuminated the facet of a commander's exactingness, that is, the check on execution. This is a completely essential element in exactingness. Certainly Lt Col Yegorov could not have helped the company if, having taught the officer advanced work methods, he did not systematically check how the recommendations received were being carried out.

Often one still encounters instances when month after month the same shortcomings are noted in the unit orders. What can be said here? One thing. In the unit there is not proper control over the fulfillment of the orders and instructions. And without this the exactingness of a commander is often nullified. Without an ability to firmly link word and deed there is not and cannot be any true exactingness of a commander.

The indoctrination of efficiency and exactingness is a most important component in ideological work. Unfortunately, this is still not considered everywhere. For example, in becoming familiar with the work plans of the party committees and bureaus, the agitation-propaganda groups and collectives, at times one can see that in the range of measures being carried out with the officers, many questions are omitted related to instilling in them a respect for the regulations, efficiency, and love for their honorable profession. And these, it can be said, are questions of great political importance. They comprise the subject of our concern for all work in the area of strengthening the indoctrinational role of the Armed Forces.

The winter training period is coming to a close. The time is approaching when we will sum up the results of the intense work, and will designate the winners of the socialist competition to properly celebrate the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin, and the 35th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. And there is no doubt that among the winners will be precisely those officers who excel in constant exactingness upon themselves and upon their subordinates as well as the ability to combine organizational and indoctrinational work in their activities.

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CSO: 1801

MISSILE AND RADAR UNITS: TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Missile Regiment Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 May 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Gusev, commander of an antiaircraft missile regiment: "Leaders in Competition"]

[Text] The subunit formation stood frozen on the expansive parade ground, which was glistening from being washed by meltwater. The flag was being raised, the conclusion of the solemn ritual of going on combat duty. I looked into the faces of the officers, warrant officers [praporshchiki], sergeants, and soldiers and saw their responding glances. Their faces were collected, concentrated, and expressed confidence and readiness to perform their combat mission outstandingly. I thought of those who went before us in the army, who protected our towns and cities, every inch of Soviet soil, from the enemy during the harsh years of war, who crushed the vicious enemy and brought glory to our socialist land by their unfading heroism.

In the strict, precise formation in front of me were their heirs, their sons and grandsons. In the distance, beyond the young birch trees trembling in the wind, the cigar-shaped bodies of the missiles sparkled in the sunlight. The crimson flag rose slowly up the flagpole.

Two years ago when I was given command of an antiaircraft missile regiment, this subunit for the first time joined the campaign for the title of outstanding unit. The subunit commander officer T. Belousov, a son of a front veteran who died in 1944, set an example in everything. T. Belousov had formerly served in the Baltic region, at the head of an outstanding subunit. Now he directed all his knowledge and experience to teaching his subordinates to master the combat equipment and perform their service duty outstandingly.

During that first, and probably most difficult, year for me as a unit commander I frequently visited this subunit. I would watch the workstyle

of the officers and take note of everything new arising out of competition in order to recommend it to the other subunit commanders later. When analyzing the actions of the missile troops in drills I set the same goal: summarize everything valuable and progressive in their training and introduce it in practice. Every time I returned to headquarters greatly enriched, full of impressions, with a charge of confidence, energy, and enthusiasm that would last some time.

Practically everyone who visited the subunit experienced the same effect. And they did have many visitors; the fame of these progressive soldiers and their experience attracted others to them. Neighbors wanted to visit the subunit to see the successes of the leaders in competition for themselves and find things that would be necessary or useful in their own work. The subunit leaders did not conceal their secrets. Rather they seemed to say, "Please have a look, make comparisons, and take what you need. These are our classrooms, and here are the trainers. This is how we achieve a spirit of competition in training periods and drills."

The missile soldiers of this subunit deserve significant credit for the fact that the unit became outstanding and today continues to expand on its progress in combat practices. By their inspired labor and excellent example the men of the subunit have gotten all personnel interested in achieving the goal.

I looked at the faces of the soldiers, who would now be standing their tense combat duty, not relaxing for a minute, ready if necessary to enter battle with an aerial enemy. They were permeated with conviction, that they would be able to perform any mission outstandingly. This conviction came from invincible faith in the men, politically mature soldiers who were masters of their weapons.

In front of the subunit stood Sr Lt Yu. Slipko. He graduated from antiaircraft missile school just two and one half years ago, but many more experienced officers could envy his successes, and his promotion in the service. He had gone from guidance officer to commander of a radar battery or, to be more precise, from the best guidance officer to commander of the best battery.

Yuriy Slipko comes from a family of antiaircraft soldiers who served at the front. His father, Grigoriy Kirillovich, took part in the fighting at Kiev, Stalingrad, and Voronezh. At war's end he was commander of an antiaircraft artillery battalion, a captain who had won several combat orders. Yuriy's mother, Natal'ya Grigor'yevna served in the battalion commanded by Capt G. Slipko. She received the Order of the Red Star and seven medals for courage and bravery.

The skill, unselfishness, and mutual assistance shown by the subordinates of Senior Lieutenant Slipko are widely respected in the regiment.

On one memorable occasion the battalion commander called headquarters just before a tactical exercise and requested that the travel documents for Sgt V. Skopintsev, leader of an operator squad who was supposed to go on a short leave the next day, be held up.

"Can't you get along without Skopintsev?" I asked.

"Of course, we can," the officer answered, and I could tell from his tone of voice that he was slightly offended that I could think such a thing of my subordinate. "But Skopintsev is insisting that his departure be postponed. So that he can leave with a good conscience, those were his words."

"But the documents are already made out and signed..."

"I know. That is why I am talking to you personally."

What could I do? I had to go along with the sergeant. My primary consideration was the reason for the request, its ethical significance and the edifying impact it would have on the other fighting men. After the exercise, at which the regiment received a high mark, it was with great satisfaction that I signed the order commending those who had distinguished themselves and saw Sergeant Skopintsev's name among them.

Electrician Pvt D. Gusev, who had a large part in the success of his subunit, also earned a commendation. After the battalion had successfully relocated at a different position, in a snowy, windswept field, and begun its combat work, one of the power supply units went out. This happened during the night after Gusev, who had worked his assigned shift, had gone off to rest. But when he heard about the trouble he immediately returned to the position and did not leave until he had put the unit back in operation. This was not easy to do, for it was under field conditions, during cold weather, with portable lamps for lighting.

These are the examples we use to indoctrinate all personnel and to measure the effectiveness of our indoctrination work. It is very gratifying to acknowledge that outstanding work is being seen more and more often recently not just among the men of the leading subunits, but also in other subunits where general progress is still modest.

For example, in the campaign to celebrate the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and the 35th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People and the Great Patriotic War, many missile soldiers did outstanding work and fulfilled their socialist obligations ahead of schedule. Introduction of the training point set up under the direction of officers V. Makhon'ko and A. Anikudinov was instrumental in this. This training point made it possible to cut training time for specialists almost in half.

Creating proper conditions for effective training and seeing that commanders and party and Komsomol organizations look after the political, military, and moral indoctrination of the men are the principal areas of our work and the foundation of success in the future.

...The missile soldiers moved off to their combat posts accompanied by march music. It is there, in the booths, at the screens and consoles, and at the launching installations, that they will begin their primary duties: protecting the peaceful skies of our Soviet Motherland.

Radar Operator Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 80 p 2

[Article by Col-Engr G. Suleymanyan: "The Combat Activism of the Operator"]

[Text] The air situation in the first stage of the tactical exercise was not particularly complex. But this is when the combat team of the radar company was slow in detecting a low-flying target, and then failed to transmit the information in properly discrete form.

During the review of the exercise many critical remarks were directed at the radar company, which had been considered a leading company. What caused such a lamentable breakdown in combat work? The reason, it turned out, was that the company commander had replaced the specialist first class on the plan position indicator with an inexperienced operator, Jr Sgt A. Mishin, who was unable to perform his assigned job properly.

Mishin was not, however, a newcomer to combat work. He had several successful target trackings to his credit. Ordinarily he had been backed up by more experienced specialists. But this exercise was the first time the junior sergeant had to work alone. He proved psychologically unprepared for this. His anxiety, fear of making a mistake, and the weight of the responsibility made him nervous and confused. When the low-flying target appeared Mishin was unable to focus his attention and coordinate his actions in a precise, thought-out manner. As a result, he made several mistakes.

The operator is obviously at fault. But a considerable share of the blame should also go to the commander and other officers of the subunit, who did not give enough attention to psychological toughening of the specialist.

This example is not, unfortunately, an isolated case. During the analysis of tactical exercises and drills one often encounters cases where operators do not have adequate endurance and self-control; they

make mistakes because of an inability to focus their will and attention at the decisive moment of battle.

Many such mistakes have been made by specialists who cannot be called inexperienced. We should note a distinctive feature here. In none of these cases was there close, business-like contact between the commander and the operator. But this is the kind of contact that is very helpful in maintaining the combat activism and psychological stability of the specialists.

The operator's work is, of course, highly specific. Every report he makes, for example on the beginning of a maneuver or the splitting up of low-flying targets, may have a large impact on the success of combat work. The tension which a specialist feels in a complex situation is easy to understand.

Unfortunately, some young subunit commanders do not consider this circumstance fully and fail to direct the combat work of radar operators skillfully. Such officers often divert their attention from performance of the combat mission, demanding additional information, reminding them what to do if the situation changes, what mode of equipment functioning should be selected, and the order in which information must be submitted. Such overguidance disrupts the rhythm of the fighting men, makes their work more difficult, and causes nervousness.

Operator first class Sgt A. Pogodin was working confidently at one of the check drills when he received an order from the command post to detect two low-flying targets in the western sector. All his efforts to find them among the terrain objects were unsuccessful.

"I observe no targets," Pogodin reported.

The officer in charge of the drill began inquiring about the equipment modes the operator was using and his search procedures. After Pogodin answered the officer demanded that he repeat all the operations. He did so and again reported that he observed no low-flying targets. The officer reproached him for a poor job. Pogodin became upset and began making mistakes. This immediately had an effect on the actions of the specialists at the command post. Their rhythm was disrupted by the late, and sometimes also inaccurate, information coming from Pogodin and they had to begin asking for clarification and further detail. Needless to say, the subunit received a low mark.

The later analysis showed that the information received by the officer in charge concerning the low-flying targets was erroneous. Completely accepting it, however, he doubted Pogodin. The officer disregarded Pogodin's conclusions and did not keep track of development of the situation on his remote screen. As we see, this had a highly detrimental effect on the combat activism of the specialists.

Confident radar reconnaissance and skillful support for the actions of missile troops and aviators are possible only if all levels of combat control operate precisely, and this in turn presupposes that the commanders have faith in the training and experience of their subordinates. The experience of exercises and drills provides many convincing examples of this.

What we have said does not, of course, mean that the commander has no right to doubt the actions of an operator or to intervene in his work when the situation demands. But what is indisputable is that such intervention should always arise from necessity. The precision of work in the "commander-operator" link is largely determined by how well the commander himself has been trained in a tactical sense and how well he has mastered operator functions.

I recently had an opportunity to visit the outstanding radar company commanded by Capt M. Buzayev. The officer has completely mastered all the equipment in his subunit and can work at any display unit and do it as well as a trained operator. He has tracked dozens of targets under complex conditions. His detailed knowledge of the fine points of operator work enables him to organize their training skillfully. Buzayev often holds short drills with the operators to size up various air situations and determine equipment operating modes before targets begin maneuvering and using interference. What has been the result? The specialists are gaining confidence in their actions, confidence that in unexpected situations they will be able to find the correct solution and confidently carry out the mission. The commander is becoming more deeply aware of the capabilities of his subordinates and their levels of combat training, which enables him to direct their combat work better.

It is common knowledge that the fighting spirit and psychological stability of military operators are directly dependent on their professional training. During the acquisition of experience a specialist assimilates knowledge and habits that are extremely important for aggressive actions in battle and learns to overcome constraining emotion and tension. Drills where operators experience various difficulties and find themselves in unexpected situations are most effective. If combat training is organized so that the operator is constantly active, working with initiative and determination, he will come to consider this kind of behavior the norm and develop corresponding emotional-volitional stability. Experienced commanders take this into account.

In the radar battalion commanded by Lt Col A. Islamov, for several years now they have kept records of situations in which operators experienced difficulty in combat work and made mistakes. When training problems are being worked on they create situations which have many of the most typical problems in them. Then the actions of the fighting men are analyzed and compared carefully, using objective monitoring data. The most effective methods of work are determined by this analysis and then introduced in practice.

The degree of development of a fighting man's attention, imagination, memory, and thinking processes is very significant for his level of activism. Highly developed perception, for example, enables an operator to issue information on a large number of targets at the first fix and track them to the maximum range. Good memory will help him remember the numbers of many targets and their routes and react in time to changes in the configuration of markers.

Short drills to solve diverse tactical problems are used widely in many subunits and promote the development of attention, memory, and imagination. Training young operators using target flight profile cards produces good results. The operator, while "tracking" targets, memorizes their flight profiles and mentally performs the necessary switching operations with the equipment. This enables him to master the specialization with more confidence and operate intelligently during combat work.

Experience shows that teaching operators high combat activism is a crucial condition for successful performance of the complex combat training missions that face air defense forces.

Missile Battalion Training Shortcomings

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 80 p 1

[Article by Lt Col G. Kocherzhinskiy: "The Lesson To Be Drawn from a Failure"]

[Text] The missile soldiers were in excellent spirit. The check inspection was coming to an end and everything looked just fine. The outstanding and good marks awarded by the strict commission had given them confidence that the battalion would again be one of the unit leaders in competition.

Suddenly, in the concluding phase of the inspection, it was learned that the battalion would receive a general mark of no higher than "satisfactory." This was both unexpected and very painful. During the winter training period the men had done a great deal to improve their combat skill and raise combat readiness. The fruits of their labor could be seen. The level of professional training and working harmony of the teams were quite high. The weak spot appeared in a place that was completely unexpected. They tripped up, so to speak, on level ground. A team from the launching platoon commanded by Sr Lt V. Dyatlev let them down.

Some officers in the battalion felt that the trouble was just a stupid mischance. During inspection of the equipment before combat work an oversight, insignificant at first glance, was permitted. But it then

became the cause of equipment failure, and as a result the launch team did not meet the standard.

The final result was poor then. This was even more upsetting because all the officers in the battalion are specialists first class. Most of them are experienced methodologists. The subunit has well-outfitted classrooms and up-to-date training equipment. So they have everything necessary to achieve good results in training.

Why did the breakdown occur? The battalion commander and his deputy in charge of armament are largely to blame. For the very best reasons they tried to give a little more attention to the radar battery, and the launch site was overlooked.

Sr Lt-Engr N. Martynov, deputy battalion commander in charge of armament, came to this position from the launch battery. He has a good engineering background and is a diligent, precise officer. But his range of duties and volume of work increased greatly in the new position. No matter how he tried, he could not take care of all his jobs at first. Moreover, he had to master the complex equipment of the radar battery as quickly as possible.

In an effort to help his deputy, the battalion commander took over certain organizational questions related to the radar battery. But regarding the launch battery, he relied entirely on Martynov, who was thoroughly familiar with both its equipment and general situation. Martynov, however, essentially stayed away from the launch battery. Why? On the one hand, he had complete confidence in the commander, the experienced officer M. Patskevich. On the other hand, it was somewhat awkward for him to check on the work of Patskevich, who had until recently been his senior officer.

The battalion commander should have corrected his deputy here, but he was not monitoring his activities. Unit administrative officer Maj-Engr G. Mel'nikov frequently visited the battalion. He also thought that the radar battery was the weakest link. Therefore he concentrated his primary attention on it.

To be fair it should be noted that the unit administrative specialist pointed out flaws in the training of the launch soldiers and their servicing and maintenance of the equipment numerous times. The battery commander reported at the proper time that the problems had been taken care of. But it appears that the battalion commander did not make a careful check of the situation.

It was under these conditions that the trouble ripened. It also happened, of course, because Maj M. Patskevich, commander of the launch battery, and his deputy Capt S. Gimpilevich, became complacent and less demanding of themselves. Captain Gimpilevich's self-confidence led him

to think it would be unnecessary to check one of the equipment parameters, even though instructions required it. This was the parameter that went beyond tolerances, which could have had a significant impact on the effectiveness of field firing.

One other circumstance should be noted. During the inspection one of the sergeants, a team leader, lost his head. If he had been accustomed to performing missions in complex situations, he would probably have found a solution in the particular situation. But the sergeant threw up his hands and looked toward the senior officers even though, it later appeared, he knew, in theory, what should be done in this situation.

Captain Gimpilevich did not do well either. When he received the report that the parameter was beyond tolerances he simply did not believe it and said that it could not be true. His failure to respond effectively was very costly to the collective.

What happened in this battalion shows once again that nothing is secondary in servicing a missile complex and preparing it for battle. All elements are important in battle. Trouble in one link will disrupt the work of the entire chain.

A party meeting conducted a principled review of the causes of this failure. They outlined concrete steps to eliminate the shortcomings identified during the summer training period and improve the quality of training periods and drills and the effectiveness of checks on the condition of the combat equipment and weapons. Their job now is to carry out these steps in practice.

Pre-Duty Preparations of Missilemen

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 May 80 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen A. Kostin: "High Morale on Combat Duty"]

[Text] Workers from headquarters and the political branch studied the organization of the training process and competition in the subunit commanded by Maj V. Bel'skiy. They also checked on how personnel are prepared to stand combat duty. The missile soldiers demonstrated good knowledge and operated skillfully with various training problems. The inspectors noted this with satisfaction.

Nonetheless, the officers from headquarters and the political branch found a number of problems. The essential point was that the subunit did not do everything it could to develop high morale among the men going on combat duty. The solemn ritual that has been established was not followed properly at all. As a result, some specialists began to think that standing combat duty was ordinary, everyday work which required no special mobilization of inner strength, will, and self-control.

This was properly criticized. At the same time the inspectors helped Major Bel'skiy eliminate many shortcomings on the spot. The commander and officers of the subunit received specific recommendations on improving indoctrination work with the men performing combat missions.

Combat watch knows no interruptions. The tireless scanning beam circles the screen day and night, and the sharp-tipped missiles stand silent guard, pointed toward the skies. The work of the men at the launch sites is filled with tension on week days and on holidays. At the first signal the launchers are ready to come alive. During their service the fighting men must go on combat duty many times, each time entering the familiar booth and operating the same equipment.

Their perception of the first days of combat duty, when impressions are new, is vivid and solemn. But time passes, filled with repetitious occurrences, and in some specialists the sharpness of perception of phenomena which have now become quite familiar diminishes. As the studies of military psychologists have demonstrated, relatively monotonous combat work causes an involuntary decrease in vigilance and even a certain carelessness and inaccuracy in performing accustomed operations. Sometimes this is accompanied by a feeling of fatigue, apathy, and a desire to avoid the performance of monotonous operations. Specialists may even experience drowsiness and a lessening of mental capacities.

These conditions, which are characteristic of continuous, fairly monotonous work, present a real problem that must be faced to see that the men perform their assigned missions with maximum effectiveness and skill.

Solid moral-fighting qualities, profound ideological conviction, and devotion to the cause of the Leninist party, the Soviet people, and the motherland are the foundation of foundations of the great vigilance of personnel on combat duty. This must be the starting point of all work to instill professional and psychological readiness for battle in specialists.

Experience shows persuasively that work by commanders and political workers to strengthen the emotional aspect of the service and teach the men a deep sense of the lofty beauty of our military workdays helps greatly in improving the indicators of combat duty. The solemn ritual has a special place in this. Conducted in strict conformity with established rules, this ritual arouses pride for the trust shown, mental enthusiasm, energy, and initiative in the men.

I will relate now how the missilemen of the outstanding unit commanded by officer B. Lyubimov handled the ritual of going on combat duty. Their combat watch was dedicated to the 110th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin. This gave everything a special, elevated meaning and inspired the men to perform their duties as well as possible.

The missile soldiers listened intently to the recorded voice of Il'ich. It seemed that the great leader of the revolution was calling on contemporary fighting men and inspiring them to defend their native Soviet power.

The regimental commander spoke in a warm, paternally trusting way. He recalled once again that the personnel of the unit were already famous for outstanding indicators in combat duty.

Sgt. V. Troshin, leader of an outstanding squad, spoke on behalf of his comrades and said, "We will be worthy of the trust that has been shown in us."

The men went off to their battle posts with great enthusiasm, inspired by the encouraging sendoff, deeply convinced that they were to perform an honorable and important task. And they lived up to these high expectations.

Only those activities which instill in the men profound patriotic feelings and pride for the trust that has been shown in them will inspire enthusiasm in the men. Among the fighting men of the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District, for example, the ritual of dedication to the guardians of the capital's skies is very popular. The presentation of the Combat Colors, the mandate from veterans of the war, the words of leaders of local party and Soviet bodies, parents, and senior comrades, and the encouragement of commanders and senior officers make a memorable impression on the men.

A political indoctrination day was held recently on the topic "Moscow — Capital of Our Country, Worker-City, Hero-City." The leaders of local party and Soviet bodies in Moscow, senior officers, and officers from the political agency and headquarters spoke to personnel.

The men studied the heroic revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of the people of Moscow and the prospects for development of the city. Many air defense soldiers had an opportunity on this day to visit Moscow itself, to go to places linked to the life and works of the great revolutionary leader V. I. Lenin. These things made a deep impression on them.

Topical evening meetings, discussions, and lectures devoted to the successes of our country in carrying out the 10th Five-Year Plan have become a tradition in the units and subunits. For example, at the initiative of Maj-Engr V. Mikhno, one of the units prepared and conducted a very interesting evening meeting on the topic "The Region That We Are Defending." The program included documentary films on the oblast in which the the missile soldiers performed their combat duty, statements by the best propagandists in the units, and an exhibit of material on the successes of leading enterprises.

Representatives of local party and Soviet bodies spoke to the fighting man. Their talks seemed to open up the club and show the men in graphic terms what they must reliably and vigilantly protect.

Love for our great socialist homeland is a beautiful and elevating feeling! In a fighting man this feeling is inseparable from hatred for its enemies, for those evil forces of imperialism who are nurturing plans for a devastating new war. It is entirely proper, therefore, for subunits to conduct discussions with fighting men going on combat duty concerning the aggressive essence of imperialism and its predatory designs that threaten peace on earth. This helps the men become more deeply aware of the fact that they are on the forward edge of defense of our socialist land.

Success in standing combat duty depends significantly on the men who are directly in charge of the teams and shifts. They are usually young officers with comparatively limited service experience. The units have developed a well-integrated and successful system of training them. It includes a number of demonstration and methodological training periods at leading subunits. Experienced commanders and political workers carefully instruct the officers who are in charge of duty teams and shifts. They teach them how to monitor the actions of personnel, organize competition, and conduct other measures to raise the vigilance of the men.

The arsenal of means to help commanders and political workers prepare fighting men for performance of the combat mission is broad and varied. But it is sometimes forgotten as soon as the watch comes to an end. But then too, the men need attention, concern, and thorough analysis of their work. Evaluation of the performance combat duty is specially important here. This has become an effective means of indoctrination among thoughtful commanders.

I would like to refer to the experience of Maj G. Potapov, commander of an outstanding battery. For many years now the subunit has carried the title of outstanding. The men perform their combat duty vigilantly and compete successfully to fulfill socialist obligations.

As soon as the specialists finish their duty shift, Major Potapov holds a thorough, detailed discussion with them. He analyzes results and carefully reviews the evaluation. The officer always compares the latest results with earlier ones. This provides an opportunity to define successes and shortcomings in preparation of the fighting men and to take operational steps.

Major Potapov once called attention to a drop in the evaluations of combat duty for the team led by PFC A. Semin. It appeared that the specialists had lowered their standards. A general meeting of personnel was held in the battery and discussed raising the accountability

of each fighting man for his assigned job. The discussion was useful not just to PFC Semin and his comrades in the team, but also to all the missile soldiers.

Of course, the senior officer of the duty shift has a key role in making the evaluation. He must be as objective and high-principled as possible. But we must admit that there are still duty officers who do not trouble themselves with a thorough analysis of the work, preferring instead to evaluate the men superficially. Their attitude seems to be that, if there are no criticisms, the entire shift can be given a high mark. With this approach the evaluation loses its instructional significance and becomes a mere formality. Who could be pleased and inspired by a high mark given "wholesale"?

Experience shows that it takes good methodological skills for officers to make an objective evaluation. But this question is not always given proper attention. Sometimes senior officers of duty shifts evaluate the actions of their subordinates by external appearances only. The result is a too-liberal approach and unjustifiably poor results.

A correct evaluation of a fighting man's efforts to successfully perform the assigned mission requires timely assistance to help him overcome shortcomings. He must be encouraged to work toward new success in combat training and in competition.

At exactly the appointed hour the order to go on combat duty rings out solemnly over the launch site. From this minute forward the fighting men are at the forward edge; they are responsible for the peaceful skies of our Motherland.

Radiotechnical Unit Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian May 80 p 2

[Article by Col A. Kalachinskiy, commander of a radiotechnical unit: "Aiming for the Future"]

[Text] Eighteen months ago the radar company commanded by Sr Lt I. Doroshenko was doing poorly. Its specialists did not have good professional training and the teams lacked working harmony and mutual replaceability. But at the end of the past training year the company earned the title of outstanding. It reaffirmed this title in the winter training period. Many of its indicators were higher than earlier results. This means that the first success was no accident. The company has definitely taken its place as one of the leaders in competition.

What brought about this company's confident progress? What reserves did it employ? In my opinion, intensification of the training process

was decisive. This was accomplished in two ways: improving the physical facilities for training and raising the level of methodological training among training leaders.

I cited one company as an example. I should emphasize, however, that the level of personnel training also rose noticeably in other subunits of the units.

Several years ago we introduced a training post at which we concentrated all the best things from training facilities in the unit. At first, however, drills there did not produce the desired results. The level of skill of operators and working harmony of teams did not improve as quickly as we wanted. Some times it also happened that a training mission would be performed well at the training post, but when a similar situation developed in the course of combat work there would be mistakes and breakdowns.

Later something else was observed. When the teams drilled at the training post they did well. But when they returned from the unit to their own subunits, the growth in professional skill among specialists was retarded.

Analysis showed that shortcomings in the organization of training periods and drills at the training post were the reason for these phenomena. The subunits would send specialists with different levels of training, but they all worked on the same programs, with the same level of difficulty. The specific conditions of combat work typical of each subunit were not adequately considered. But the topography and zones of visibility of radar stations differ significantly.

It appeared that the matter was simple and we only needed to get to work and solve it. But then we learned that with the existing facilities at the training post it could not be done. The post lacked work positions, trainers, and simulators. Some objective monitoring and automation equipment was outdated. The instructions for organizing drills needed revision. In short, the training point had to be reorganized on a qualitatively new basis.

Officers B. Dydyk, V. Luk'yanov, and S. Tkachenko, who were in charge of the job, were given this mission: the training post must allow us to conduct drills in different air situations with all subunit personnel, take maximum account of the individual levels of training of the specialists, and instill optimal skills in performance of combat work. This was not an easy job, and it required creative solutions to many technical and methodological questions. But they were able to do it. Moreover, several additional places were set up at the training point and new manuals aimed at the future were developed.

The new training point became one of the best (based on the results of the competitive inspection of physical facilities for training) in the

radiotechnical troops of the National Air Defense Forces. Broad capacities made it possible to sharply improve the quality of combat training. Whereas formerly a significant part of the time allocated for training assemblies at the training post had to be spent establishing the level of training of each specialist, team, and subunit as a whole, now special schedules made it possible both to do this very quickly and, most importantly, to choose the optimal programs for drills.

Warrant officers A. Shvets, V. Bochkovich and other experienced specialists with master's qualifications teach the fighting men what to do in various instructive situations. Each training program has many such situations. Subunit drills are usually directed by the unit commander or his deputies.

Here is the result. After going through assemblies at the training post an absolute majority of the fighting men work at a level higher than their rating qualification and the teams develop good combat teamwork and the ability to perform complex missions with confidence. The special programs that have been developed for the drills include air situations that are possible in practice.

Of course, drills at the training post are just one part of the training process. Therefore, it is very important that the skills acquired by specialists be improved constantly. This depends largely on the methodological skill of company and battalion officers, on their ability to prepare and conduct drills with the subunits.

Incidentally, opportunities are envisioned at the training post for improving the methodological skill of training leaders. The work positions are outfitted with special panels, mapboards, monitoring equipment, and reference tables. Unit efficiency workers built what is called the combined situation display unit for more reliable control of actions by subordinates. This unit receives information from all the radars. It has circuits for working out combat control algorithms that contain the experience of the best subunit commanders. Uniform methodologies have been developed for working on training missions. Recommendations have been written for developing teamwork and using trainers and simulation equipment. Training periods for officers are held on the use of the technique of shaping mental actions and concepts by stage. During the winter training period this technique was widely used in all the subunits of the unit.

As results demonstrate, this approach to the organization of combat training has worked very well. Many subunits achieved excellent results in socialist competition and the unit won the title of outstanding.

Analyzing the results of this past period, however, one must conclude that there are still unused reserves, possibilities that have not been considered. For example, some radar operators demonstrated only

satisfactory knowledge in technical and special training during the check inspection. Moreover, their problems arose with the same questions that were difficult for specialists earlier.

With the beginning of the summer training period we are correcting this situation. The emphasis continues to be on intensification of the training process. The group of amateur film-makers led by Sr Lt S. Marchenko has produced several film strips and training films on difficult subjects. Efficiency workers built a device to synchronize the movie and film strip projectors with tape recorders. Specialists can now expand their knowledge on various training subjects without the participation of a training leader. All they have to do is dial the proper code on the console and the automation equipment will trace a particular electrical circuit in the diagram.

The problem of centralized construction of training aids for subunit classrooms is also being solved. A large group of unit efficiency workers and craftsmen is involved in this. The final goal of this project is to see that every company and battalion has a small, compact training post at which it will be possible to work on the specific training missions of the particular subunit.

Experience demonstrates that the search for ways to improve combat training is most effective if weak links in the training of specialists and teams are identified at the right time. For example, at one time our unit was poorly trained in questions such as the performance of marches and relocating equipment to stand-by positions because the vehicle drivers' level of training was inadequate. Operational steps were taken immediately to eliminate these shortcomings.

The campaign to intensify the training process is constantly raising new, more difficult problems. If these problems are solved at the right time, creatively and skillfully, with an eye to the future, this will provide favorable conditions for continuously improving the quality of combat training and for complete fulfillment of socialist obligations. Our own experience convinces us that this is true.

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NAVAL UNIT: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Political Officer Activities

Moscow KRAMNAYA ZEMLA in Russian 8 May 89 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank S. Bystrov: "Loyalty to the Sea"]

[Excerpt] It should have not been noticed and, really, Basmashko did not understand this at once. He picked up the receiver--new and expensive. He glanced at the commander, and conjecture burned. He didn't even hear clearly the diplomatic words of the ship's commander, Captain 3d Rank A. Kovalenko, words which "lead one aside." He replaced the receiver and thought for a while: "They are preparing to see me off. And this receiver--it is for me." He didn't quite feel himself. But he had to find a way out of the situation....

"Now about it, Anatoliy Fedorovich, shall we begin?" asked Basmashko as if nothing had happened.

"Let us begin, Viktor Ivanovich," the commander answered, as usual, with a smile.

He closed the door to his cabin softly. They both adapted themselves to the small work table with a pile of papers. They had to discuss important questions concerning the forthcoming cruise. During this year and a half how many matters large and small did the two of them tackle, conceive, begin, and bring to a conclusion.

"It is difficult to believe, Viktor Ivanovich, that you will not be on the ship," said the commander recently when he had first learned that a new place of duty was awaiting his deputy for political affairs. Really, Basmashko himself could not imagine how his ship could go to sea without him.

But today, it was no longer a secret from anyone that he was being transferred to the political department.

...The two stopped at the fork. Farther--on foot. Several kilometers. It was a warm day in an early arctic autumn. Captain 3d Rank Basmashko picked up

his willow and began to walk along the rough road which had been carved out in the rock along the small lake. The rock rose steeply and high, turned green with moss, yellow with the tiny leaflets of the bushes, and red with berries. All this was interesting and aroused his curiosity. But suddenly it grew dark, the wind pulled, and a cold rain struck. When he reached the KPP [traffic regulating post] soaked and chilled through and through it was bad gloomy, northern weather.

But you see, he had planned a different path. Completing the Military-Political Academy named V. I. Lenin, Romashko already knew that he would work in a political department. He felt that he was ready for a new assignment: he did much sailing before his studies and had great experience in political work. In short, he had seen and experienced much and had been awarded an order.... And suddenly, a call to the personnel section of the Navy Political Directorate. The conversation was brief: a deputy commander is needed at once on a missile carrier, in the Northern Fleet. The situation on the ship, they said, was difficult and an experienced, firm political officer is required.

The communist's duty requires.... This does not at all mean that people who are accustomed to being guided by a sense of party duty do not experience difficulties in making decisions. For you see, they have their own personal plans and hopes, and family circumstances introduce their "adjustments" at times. Then, at the KPP, while stepping across the boundary of the unknown garrison he suddenly asked himself: but wasn't I hasty in agreeing?... But he was already eager to see the crew which they called difficult and which would now be his crew. Romashko tried to imagine the problems he would have to encounter. Anything was possible in his service, but he never shirked his duties and firmly believed that a way can be found out of any situation.

In his former crew, he was especially convinced of this after one incident. The crew, one can say, lost a good officer, an experienced and competent specialist--the commander of the engineer department. He began to think about leaving the Navy. His wife left him, retiring to the Caucasus. Her parents lured her all the same--they did not like this marriage and believed that the seaman-non-in-law brings little honor to their respected family.

What was to be done in such a situation? Captain-Lieutenant Romashko sat down and wrote a warm article about the engineering officer where he also told about the officer's lofty duty, about the glorious profession of submariner, and about the people's love for naval seamen. He attached a photograph and sent it all to Osetia, to the newspaper.

That's what was needed! Where they did not want to recognize the man he suddenly stood in high esteem. His wife's relatives wrote that they had been mistaken, that they are all proud of him. And the commander of department-1 returned from leave with his wife--happy, everything as it was before.

...The fog is swirling and swirling. Viktor Ivanovich got home very late, and was already on his feet in the morning at the crack of dawn. He hurried

to arrive at the ship a little earlier, before morning colors. And on 1st of lightness and joy in these assemblies. At such moments, Sumniza often recalled the words of the political officer on the ship on which he began his naval service, Captain 1st Rank T. Boudretinov. Accompanying Vistur in the street, he said: "The seamen regard the political officers highly for many qualities, but especially--for our loyalty to service and the sea."

Yes, the time came to take leave of the ship. A year and a half--how fast it flew by. It was difficult to part with people who had become dear to him. But you see, loyalty to the sea remains and it will always unite them by one great, common cause.

Submarine Crew Combat Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 80 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank M. Dukov and Capt 3d Rank L. Zelenakiy: "At the Spearhead of the Attack"]

[Text] The sonarmen of the submarine discovered the "enemy" ship in time. In making his decision for the torpedo attack the commander, Captain 2d Rank V. Bondarchuk, was confident that an effective victory was guaranteed for the crew. But to the great amazement of the submariners, the torpedo salvo did not turn out to be sniper-like.

In explaining the reasons for the failure, the submarine commander hurled reproaches on the specialists of the torpedo department. But an objective and thorough check showed that this time the torpedomen operated errorlessly. The "trouble" occurred in other elements of the ship's combat section (KBR).

Individual submariners are relying more on intuition than on calculation. And some of them do not listen to commands with sufficient attentiveness and do not always execute them with irreproachable clarity. At times, reports were wordy and not always precise. The operator of one of the systems did not perform in the best manner at the critical moment of attack--he input the recommended data in the instruments with some delay. Then a sonarman made a mistake, lost the target for a time, and the attack could not be repeated. And the commander, overestimating the KBR's level of work harmony, did not adopt in good time the measures necessary in the organization of his subordinates and did not check to see if all his instructions are being executed clearly.

So it turned out that the ship's combat section could not accomplish the assigned mission with quality because of insufficient coordination and the relatively poor training of individual seamen. It is a rare case, but it forces us to ponder over it seriously.

The ship's combat section is called the combat nucleus of the ship. And it is named correctly--the KBR is always at the spearhead of the attack. Here, information on the situation is evaluated and displayed. And here the

analysis which follows from the commander's tactical concept is prepared and its execution is organized. The fluidity of a sea battle, especially in a war on one situation, does not provide the opportunity to repeat one element or another. This means that one can count on success only in the case where each member of the KBR is well trained in his specialty and tactically and is able to analyze the situation literally in seconds and make the only correct decision. Here, it is important to be able to make a competent estimate of the hydrological characteristics of the sailing area, select the optimum depth of submersion correctly, and give the commander of the ship well-reasoned recommendations on the employment of weapons. At the same time, excellent individual training of the seamen still does not guarantee steady success. Victory is where the clear interaction of all battle stations which are part of the KBR is attained.

Knowledge and skills do not come to the seamen by themselves. The coordination of the crew does not arise spontaneously. The combat effectiveness of the KBR is improved in the course of drills at the base and at sea. And the skill and coordination of the crew members grows more rapidly the more intensive the systematic drills and the more thoughtfully they are structured. Forgetting this requirement leads to failure, as evidenced by the episode presented above. On this ship the training schedule was disrupted, referring to "objective" reasons (post-cruise repair, loading of weapons, and so forth). Here the monthly standard, for example, was "spun through" at an accelerated rate in two or three days. Versions of going into the attack and new tactical procedures were not worked out.

This practice in training the ship's combat section received serious condemnation in the unit headquarters. The incident also forced ship commanders who are personally responsible for the training of KBR's for operations in the rapidly changing situation of a naval battle to ponder many things. Responsible personnel began to devote more attention to the integrated training of each section member. On quickie tactical exercises with the gaming of battles with a strong, well-equipped and well-trained "enemy," the leaders now see that the seamen not only accomplish specific situations but also improve their tactical ability.

Drills in the training offices and at sea are now conducted under the slogan, "Tactical thinking by each member of the KBR." This slogan is being put into practice with special skill on the submarine which was commanded until recently by Capt 2d Rank A. Belousov. Here nonstandard, psychologically acute situations are created on each drill. A way out of them can be found quickly only by a comprehensively trained seaman who knows not only his own specialty but also the special features of work at other battle stations and who has a clear impression of the commander's concept.

The ship's commander thoroughly analyzes each error which appears to be insignificant at first glance. Here, he not only makes remarks but, on the spot, provides specific recommendations as to what should receive attention in order to prevent such errors at various stages of the battle.

the carefully attended diving helps the submariners to get rid of errors more quickly and acquaints them to operating in a tactically competent manner with maximum benefit for the KBR as a whole.

Here, the commander makes effective use of the great capabilities provided by the shore-based attack office for drilling the ship's combat action. A creative atmosphere reigns on lessons on the firing simulator which contributes to the maintenance of a spirit of competition among the submariners. The officers display constant concern for the daily working out of their subordinates' coordination. Such lessons and drills help the members of the KBR to master quickly the various models of naval battle proposed by the flagship against a difficult tactical background.

The experience of the leading ship is generalized and is being widely disseminated in the unit. Some time ago, for example, the successful operations of this submarine against a detachment of surface ships became a subject for comprehensive study. At that time, under conditions of intensive jamming the submariners selected the main target and, by a precise maneuver, occupied an advantageous position for the salvo. The main target was destroyed by the first torpedo at maximum range.

After the submariners' bold attack the ships tried to undertake everything possible to "destroy" the submarine. However, the smoothly-operating KBR also rose to the occasion here. In the difficult situation the sonarmen worked with filigree skill as they provided the commander with exhaustive information. Other specialists also demonstrated excellent training. Being firmly confident that the KBR is able to realize any tactical concept, the commander did not get forth on the beaten track. Instead of breaking away from the surface ships, as the "enemy" expected, he decided to execute a maneuver, outwit the opposing side, and launch one more strike. And just as in the first case, the attack was irreproachably organized.

The rates of growth in the skill of the KBR depend greatly on the special and tactical ability of the ship's commander, his experience, and his ability to organize the training of his subordinates clearly. A so-called flagship KBR has been created by the unit staff for the more highly qualified training of ship commanders. It includes staff officers who are the leading specialists of the unit. The very first drills showed that the staff officers operate without errors and note each inaccuracy committed by the ship commander being checked.

Involved in such drills more often than others are commanders of ships who do not have sufficient experience and who need the assistance of their senior comrades in questions of the tactics of naval battle. They are given the opportunity to make an estimate of the situation and make the decision for the attack. And if the commander's decision is not distinguished by originality and a profound analysis of the tactical background, the leader of the drill introduces corrections with consideration of the recommendations of the staff officers from the flagship KBR. As a rule, the latter's suggestions are corroborated by precise calculations which consider any change in the situation.

In rejecting someone's suggestion, the leader of the drill explains on the spot why he is doing so. The instruction turns out to be graphic, and the drill--effective. The commander acquires skills in controlling a ship's combat section, being objectively convinced how important for success in battle are the fine-tuning of the KBR and the ability of its members to understand the overall concept and subordinate their actions to it so as always to be in the vanguard of the attack, at the spearhead of the fleet.

Admiral Usenko's Book Reviewed

Moscow KRAMNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 May 83 p 2

[Article by Adm V. Aleksyev, Hero of the Soviet Union: "On Ocean Cruises"]

[Text] It is not so often that one can encounter on the shelves of book stores works on a naval subject which would disclose clearly and convincingly the atmosphere of the life of the contemporary fleet and the characters of today's generations of seamen. Therefore, it is with great interest that I discovered the book by Vice Admiral N. Usenko, "V pokhodakh okeanskikh" [On Ocean Cruises]*, hoping to learn and to see something new. And I am glad that my hopes were not disappointed.

The book's author, Hero of the Soviet Union, Vice Admiral N. Usenko--a participant in the famous round-the-world cruise of a detachment of nuclear submarines and long-distance ocean sailing of surface ships--tells an emotional and exciting story about service in the Navy, about our glorious traditions and ceremonies, about the romance of the sea, and about ships and people. It is believed that a "bridge" is thrown successfully from the first long-distance cruise of the training ship "Komsomolets," on which the author began his naval service in his youth, to today's ocean cruises of many months. And it is no longer an old training ship which is going around Europe, but contemporary nuclear-powered vessels which are sent off on an around-the-world underwater orbit while missile cruisers and large antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ships sail across two oceans and many seas.

Interesting details from training and service and lyrical digressions are recalled. Pictures of ceremonial send-offs of ships on a cruise, the efficient concern and intense calmness when the nuclear-powered vessel is moving at periscope depth, the traditional Neptune celebration, and the majesty and beauty of the ocean appear visibly before the reader's eyes.

But nevertheless, the basic merit of the book, "On Ocean Cruises," is in the disclosure of the seamen's character. The book's heroes are traced out by the author with love and tact and with a mild humor. The story is imbued with respect and goodwill for people of various service statuses. On the pages of the book we meet in various circumstances the commander in chief and

* N. V. Usenko, "V pokhodakh okeanskikh," Izd-vo DOSAAF, 1979, 144 pages, price 55 kopecks.

a diesel-turbine operator, commander of a detachment of surface ships and a secretary of a submarine's party organization.

Being a political officer the author, naturally, devotes much attention in the book to the special features of party-political work on long cruises. Here, he succeeded in avoiding dry narration and the simple listing of work forms. The main thing on which the author rests attention is work with people. Unnoticed and unobtrusively, he leads the reader to the conclusion that the basis of success in political-indoctrinational work is an individual approach to a person and skillful reliance on the strength and influence of the collective.

The genre of the book is that of a documentary essay. It is written in graphic language. The author, together with others, feels, endures, shares experiences, is gladdened by successes, and distressed by failures.

Using specific episodes, the book shows us the contemporary ocean-going fleet and the main thing in its activity--long cruises and the lofty moral and combat qualities of the fleet's men who are carrying the flag of the fatherland with honor over seas and oceans.

Submarine Commander on Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 80 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank Ye. Ivashchenko, submarine commander: "Lessons of Pedagogy"]

[Text] The submarine's crew is frozen in a precise formation. I stand in front of the formation and glance at the seamen's faces. The senior commander presents me to my future subordinates....

More than a year has passed since my appointment to the post of commander and everything is remembered down to the finest details--the first report by the officer of the deck, and the first, for some reason, not very friendly response of the seamen to my "Good morning, comrades," and the first, of course, still fleeting impression: "What different people in the collective, and probably, what different characters!..."

The commander of a submarine has hundreds of the most diverse concerns. But from the first days of my performance of this duty the most important and difficult proved to be problems of pedagogy, problems in indoctrinating people. The submarine had already been considered a lagging one for a long time. The seamen accomplished training-combat missions with mediocre grades. Military discipline in the collective left much to be desired. And the main reason for these shortcomings was that individual commanders of departments and groups and petty officers of crews worked with people, so to say, with "primitive methods"--without a profound study of the special features of their characters and without an integrated approach to indoctrination.

In short, it was necessary to begin with the indoctrination of the indoctrinators themselves, with raising their pedagogical skill. The commanders of departments and officers of the staff and political section directed me toward this. A conversation about this took place at the next meeting of the submarine's party organization. I also spoke at it. I tried in every way possible to convince the communists to turn and face pedagogy, to study its theory more deeply, and to conduct a persistent search for effective procedures and methods for the instruction and indoctrination of the personnel.

Training methods assemblies on the most urgent problems of military pedagogy and psychology began to be conducted regularly with the crew. We organized several presentations before young officers and warrant officers [michman] by our best methodologists--Captain Lieutenant Ye. Durnev, Senior Lieutenant L. Baranov, and others. We began to make active use of such a form as the critique of the indoctrinational practice of one comrade or another. For example, an instructive conversation took place concerning the work style of Lieutenant V. Pavlov. At times, the generally competent officer forgot about the necessity for commander's tact, self-control, and attention to people. In speaking about his errors and analyzing them, the officers also drew conclusions for themselves.

I tried to back up these measures with individual work with the comrades who were called upon to be my assistants in the struggle to strengthen military discipline and rally the collective.

Speaking honestly, many difficulties were encountered here. By itself, assignment to the duty of commander does not add experience. It was necessary to begin working with people with the store of knowledge and skills which I had accumulated while a commander of a subunit and executive officer. But you see, the commander of a ship is called upon to solve pedagogical problems of a much higher order. The commander of a ship is a special duty. He is invested with tremendous responsibility for the ship. And this also means for everyone who serves on it. Obviously, it turns out that in the collective the one who is entrusted with the captain's bridge is looked upon as the most knowing methodologist, the most skillful educator, and a teacher who has grown wise with experience. And one cannot fail to justify these hopes.

I recall how at first instances of violation of military discipline in the engineer department (BCh-5) worried me. It was headed by Engineer-Captain 3d Rank A. Shanin. He is a most experienced specialist, but here he underestimated the significance of thoughtful, painstaking work with people. It was necessary to correct the comrade. With the assistance of the ship's political officer, Captain-Lieutenant Ye. Durnev, and party and Komsomol activists I tried to make a deeper study of the state of affairs in BCh-5.

In order to gain a better understanding, it was also necessary to dig thoroughly into the appropriate pedagogical literature and even to glance at my old school synopses. In general, before teaching a lesson in pedagogy to a subordinate it was necessary to teach such a lesson to myself. In return, an analysis of the style of Shanin's indoctrinational work proved to be

detailed and reasoned. The officer understood his mistakes, drew the correct conclusions, and matters in BCh-5 took a turn for the better.

For some reason, we often speak of the processes of instruction and indoctrination as one-sided processes. There is a teacher, there is, so to speak, an object on which he must exert an influence with all his strength, giving various knowledge to a person and generating the corresponding convictions on its basis.... But, you see, there is also feedback here. The prominent Soviet teacher, V. Sukhomlinskiy, said that before giving the pupil one spark of knowledge the teacher must absorb an entire world of light himself. Personal experience, personal erudition, personal example--these are frequently the most important and most effective lessons of pedagogy.

I recall how much I instilled in the commanders of departments Senior Lieutenant V. Kupriyanov and Lieutenant A. Churikov: be closer to people, study them better. I felt that this is just what the young teachers lack in order to achieve success and, not sparing strength and time, I convinced them to get rid of the office or, to put it more correctly, "cabin" style of work. Alas, all my appeals sounded to no purpose until I finally understood: I myself am teaching the lieutenants...in a cabin. But when I personally and in fact showed Churikov and Kupriyanov what it means to "go to the people," how the commander should conduct himself in the crew's bunk room, and how to get to know the men in a free and easy conversation, a taste for daily contact with the seamen also appeared among the officers and, with time, this also became a habit.

The decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrinational work," stresses that the effectiveness of indoctrinational work is reduced significantly where a gap appears between word and deed.... This proposition is very important. In my opinion, the following principle follows from it most directly: in teaching, learn yourself, in indoctrinating others, do not forget about self-indoctrination.

This is doubly necessary for the commander of a ship. In accordance with his service duty, he is called upon to teach pedagogical skill to his subordinate officers, warrant officers, and petty officers. In this regard, he is required to do this constantly, always, and everywhere, in any situation --both while the ship is anchored at its base and on a cruise. While the ship is at its base he, just as the other officers, must participate in various types of training-methods assemblies and seminars and can, in case of necessity, turn to the staff or political section for advice and assistance in the solution of one or another pedagogical problem.

But when the submarine departs on a cruise, this possibility is excluded. Here, lessons in pedagogy can be obtained from no one like from pedagogy itself. In other words, it is important for the commander of a ship, as for no one else, to be concerned about self-improvement and about deep independent work on raising his methodological level. I made it a rule that prior to each departure to sea it is mandatory that I also plan the following work for myself along with tactical studies and other types of command training.

I provide myself with training aids, studies, and special literature ahead of time. Very much that is useful can be drawn from memoirs. For example, I was often able to find interesting everyday answers on how a submarine commander should operate in one or another pedagogical situation in the memoirs of I. A. Kolyshkin, S. I. Shchedrin, I. V. Travkin, and other combat heroes.

In the course of the voyage itself I must try every day to find at least a half hour in order, so to say, to "stop and look around," analyze my decisions and deeds, and adjust their conformance to the most important pedagogical principles. This is also training. Life constantly demands the expansion of the arsenal of procedures and methods for the instruction and indoctrination of the personnel and puts forth newer and newer problems. Therefore, it is not enough for the commander only to master what has been found by others, he must step forth in the role of investigator himself.

Take, let us say, a problem such as increasing the indoctrinational return from socialist competition. It cannot be denied that this is a difficult matter and many questions here are still insufficiently studied.

For example, how should such most important means for increasing the soldierly zeal of the men as the moral encouragement of them in the course of competition and the daily disciplinary practice of commanders interact with each other? In practice, the commander selects one measure or another for rewarding or moral encouragement purely intuitively.

When we delved a little deeper into the study of this question and collected the corresponding statistics and facts, it turned out that with our outward well-being at times the matter really became a special case. People having strict disciplinary punishment sometimes landed among the leaders of the competition. Or, conversely, men who were chronically lagging in the competition were suddenly rewarded for some "one-time distinction" which clearly does not correspond to their services.

We had to perform much labor to develop in all officers a clearer view of the indoctrinational role of competition. An integrated approach to the solution of problems in training and indoctrination was discussed at special officers' training-methods assemblies. After this, the effectiveness of disciplinary practice was raised in the crew and the indoctrinational return from competition increased. The struggle for first place in comradesly competition and for successes in combat and political training proceeded even more actively in the collective.

Great changes occurred in the collective. This is evident from the results which have already been attained--the crew is accomplishing all combat-training missions only with grades of good and excellent, and from the goals which people are now setting for themselves--to win the title of outstanding ship. The crew is growing. It is pleasant to realize this. It is also pleasant to realize that you are also growing yourself together with them. Of course, those lessons of pedagogy which you strive to teach people and, as a result, you also receive cannot go for naught.

...I receive the report by the officer of the deck and turn facing the formation: "Good morning, comrades!" The crew answers in a friendly manner, in a single breath. Now I know each one well and am firmly confident of each one.

Submarine Navigator Activities

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 May 80 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt. V. Gromak: "Navigator of an Underwater Missile Carrier"]

[Text] Tomorrow--the accomplishment of an important task. The point of light of the automatic position plotter is creeping slowly over the plotting board. The commander of the navigator's department (BCh-1), Captain-Lieutenant Aleksandr Donnik, together with the commander of the electrical navigation group, Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Markov, is trying out various versions for the ship to emerge in the indicated area. The officers are working with maximum attention as they are trying to consider all factors which may influence the accuracy in determining the ship's location. Looking on from the side, one could think that they are accomplishing the same task in parallel and equally. In reality, a drill is now under way during which the experienced master is teaching his junior colleague a difficult but necessary lesson.

One special situation is replaced by another. To the satisfaction of the department commander, Senior Lieutenant Markov is adopting competent, well substantiated decisions. Perhaps tomorrow Markov will not have to accomplish such a difficult mission, but the day after tomorrow or in a month won't such an exceptional situation as the one in which Donnik is now placing his subordinate arise?...

After completing the higher naval school in 1973, Donnik arrived on board the submarine in the duty of group commander. The lieutenant perceived service on the submarine as a great honor. He did much work to improve himself and improved his practical skills, understanding how difficult and responsible it is to be a navigator. Practice soon confirmed this.

...The submarine went into a missile attack. The checker put the department commander "out of action" and he, Aleksandr Donnik, was to head the subunit at the most important moment. Hearing, vision, all attention--to the commands and reports, to the instrument readings and the sheet of the maneuvering board where the bearings to the required point are plotted. Thoughts were occupied with the search for the logical interdependence of various values. Course, speed, range, regular laws of maneuvering--the navigator sees the attack through them. From an abstraction, he must form in his head a fully specific and clear picture of this brief attack for the plotting and accomplishment of which seconds are allotted at times.

The lieutenant, sensing the rhythm of what had occurred, had already begun to calm down when suddenly his data began to diverge from data of the automatic

device. Donnik glanced at the central control compartment for the first time. He intercepted the amazed gaze of the executive officer and saw the stern face of the commander and the hands of the navigation electrician which were lifting a pencil which had been dropped.

"Is it really an error? But where?" feverishly rushed through his brain.

At first, the command, "Continue the attack with the navigator's data," did not reach the lieutenant. He nevertheless tried to find the error. And he suddenly understood: there was none. And the commander trusts him, the navigator and the ship is on the correct course.

This was one more special situation--a "malfunction" of the automatic device. The specialists "eliminated" it on the spot and Donnik finally had confidence in himself. He was also believed in by the commander of the ship who, in battle, must have special contact with the navigator and relations of special confidence.

Two years after coming to the ship, Donnik was appointed department commander. In one more year this navigator's department was declared excellent and the commander became a master of combat qualification.

High self-demandingness, pride in his service on a submarine--the commander of BCh-1 especially values these qualities in his subordinates. He speaks of this on his first meeting with newcomers and, by personal example, he teaches them to serve with complete output and to be ardently anxious for the honor of their ship. And it has already become a tradition in the department that the submariners are released to the reserve only as 1st-class specialists.

Senior Lieutenant V. Markov is grateful to the department commander for the science of being strict toward himself. He has managed to accomplish much during his short service on the ship: he became a 2d-class specialist and an expert of combat and political training. The commander of the electrical navigation group has also made a significant contribution to the overall success of the navigator's department which, for the third time in a row, has confirmed the title of excellent. The subunit is the leader in training and competition.

The task for the accomplishment of which the officers of BCh-1 prepared thoroughly had great significance for the retention of this leadership. And it was accomplished on the first attempt with a high grade although the checker placed Senior Lieutenant Markov in difficult situations. The lessons of the master of combat qualifications, Captain-Lieutenant Donnik, are providing fruitful results.

School Admission Announcement

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 May 80 p 4

[Article: "Lomonosov Nautical School of the Navy Announces Enrollment for the First Course in 1980"]

[Excerpts] The school trains specialists with a secondary special education for work in command assignments on naval support vessels.

Enrollment takes place on the basis of a secondary education in the following specialties: vessel-operation technician, vessel-engineering technician, electrician-technician, and radio mechanic.

Period of instruction is 3 years 4 months.

The school accepts youths 17 years of age and older, in good health suitable for work in the Navy.

Persons are enrolled without competition upon receiving favorable grades on the entrance examinations if they have at least two years of practical work experience or are servicemen who have been released to the reserve from active duty.

The school's cadets are completely supported by the state.

Entrance examinations are conducted from 1 through 10 August in Russian language and literature (composition) and in mathematics (oral).

For the time of the examinations, matriculants from out of town are offered free dormitory accommodations.

Those who complete the school are awarded all-union-type diplomas attesting to a secondary technical education.

Address of the school: 188510 Lomonosov, Leningradskaya oblast, ulitsa Krasnogo Flota, d. 18/48. Enrollment commission.

ASW Ships Compete in Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 80 p 2

[Article: Capt 2d Rank L. Buchinskiy, Red Banner Black Sea Fleet: "Two Ships are Competing"]

[Text] White triangles of the seagulls are above the bay. Two ships are at the pier. Side by side. They have the similarity of twins, and one purpose: to look for submarines. And they are commanded by friends--Captain Lieutenants Yuriy Neminushchiy and Genadiy Antsiferov.

When Nemrushchiy was appointed commander of the ship, Antsiferov had been in that post for more than a year already. By right of more experience, on the recommendation of the division staff he assumed a unique patronage over his younger comrade. Until Nemrushchiy received permission to control a ship independently, Antsiferov gave him "accompanied" departures to sea. By then, they had learned where his strong points were. Nemrushchiy calculated range clearly and maneuvered skillfully when passing through narrows and when meeting other ships--his excellent navigator's training had its effect. Antsiferov surpassed his comrade in tactics and in the skill of weapons employment and the ability to organize a torpedo attack.

In the last training year, the competition of the friends was corroborated by the officially drawn-up competition between the crews. By that time, Nemrushchiy had mastered his duty and gained experience in independent cruises. He then accepted Antsiferov's challenge without timidity. By the end of the year, thanks to the competition both ships had become outstanding and the leaders in the unit in many things.

With the start of this training year, the competition of the ships flared up with new force. Of course, not without the support of the staff and the political department which were interested in selecting approximately equal competitors. They reasoned as follows: the competition will not give the proper effect if a weak ship is alongside a strong one, when it is clear who will win even without a struggle.

The paired competition of ships is a comparatively new and uncommon matter. Formerly, it often happened that, let us say, repair work was begun on one of the competing ships somewhere in the middle of the training year. The rivalry ended with this. At times, it was forgotten that in accordance with the plan for combat training one of the crews would accomplish tasks on a long cruise and the other--in coastal waters or at the base. Things did not merge together: how could the leader be determined here?

The competition of the ships required a search for new criteria in evaluating the combat training of the crews and forced a different approach to questions of comparability and publicity. Let us say, the results of the competition of subunits on a scale of one ship are easily reflected in graphs which are hung in prominent places. Ship's radio can also be used for this. But now, for example, the torpedo department competes with the same subunit of the other ship. Their commanders, Lieutenants S. Gasikov and O. Danilov, also compete. How can we determine who achieved the best results in a day and week of sailing if the ships are separated by many miles?

The fleet's staff officers introduced clarity in the solution of these and many other questions of this type. They worked out clear criteria for grading and determined that the commanders of ships and their assistants must compete as part of the ships' antisubmarine warfare [ASW] sections [KPR] in specific indices. And primary attention should be devoted to the competition between KPR's. The seamen who make up the sections compete in five elements:

knowledge of galley documents, priority in working out training-combat assignments, raising rating qualifications, and a number of others. The ships compete in 11 elements. Points are determined for realization of each of the items. On their basis a grade is assigned to each seaman and the ship as a whole for a month, period of training, and year.

At the beginning of the year, the competing crews exchanged texts of obligations, both shipwide and individual. For example, Captain-Lieutenant Ruminskii read the following point in the obligations of Captain-Lieutenant Antsiferov: "To attain permission for the independent control of the ship's hunter-killer group," and he decided to weigh all "pro's" and "con's" and attain this goal. Other seamen also amended the obligations. Thus, the political officer, Senior Lieutenant N. Romanov, having become acquainted with the personal plans of his rival in the competition, planned very capacious points for himself: to struggle for the title of best officer of the watch, to receive permission for independent control of the ship, and to become a 3d class communications specialist.

From the first days of the winter training period the commanders of the competing ships devoted special attention in organizing socialist competition to a growth in the ability of the seamen who are members of the ship's ASW section (KVB). For example, some of the obligations of department commanders and of other men were concretely defined for time down to the second. Thus, officers S. Tyshchenko, G. Vas'ko, and others planned specific goals in exceeding the times for preparing the equipment for action.

Formerly, the commander of the engineering department (BCh-5) was not included in the ship's ASW section which, at times, reduced the efficiency of combat work. It happened that they were ready for the attack at all stations, and mistakes sprang up among the gas-turbine men or other specialists of this subunit. In the competing crews, the engineering officers were included in the ship's ASW section. A common checklist was worked out for them. They described what they do in various situations. With consideration of this, Engineer-Senior Lieutenant Yu. Petrov and Engineer-Lieutenant A. Kol'tsov assumed serialist obligations for the year. Now the "lack of coordination" on this sector has been eliminated.

The crews competed intensely during the winter training period, trying to win first place. But they did not envy each other's success, and there was no striving to belittle the merits of the rival and somehow raise one's own. On the contrary, the seamen spoke openly about their shortfalls and willingly shared leading experience. So-called "commander's 15 minute sessions" are conducted here regularly. Commanders of ships and commanders of similar subunits met prior to each departure for sea and discussed down to the finest details the order of actions when firing, on an exercise in searching for a submarine, and so forth. After returning to base, again a meeting, critique of the cruise, and an exchange of experiences.

"At what range did your ship establish contact with the target?" Nemimushchiy asked Antsiferov at their last meeting. The latter mentioned the number of cable's lengths.

"And we took a submarine somewhat closer. It's interesting, why?"

A joint analysis took place and a conclusion is drawn: it is necessary to check and regulate the linear system. Actually, one of the parameters had to be changed.

The relations of the competing crews and their commanders are distinguished by mutual assistance and sincere interest in seeing that things are going for the rival as well as on their own ship. One day Captain-Lieutenant Nemimushchiy became ill. His assistant did not have permission for independent control and the ship was threatened with temporary anchorage at the base and a breakdown of the plan for combat training. Captain-Lieutenant Antsiferov, on whose ship repair work was being accomplished at that time, went to sea on the "strange" MPK (small submarine chaser), checked the tactical training of Nemimushchiy's subordinates, and conducted several drills with the ship's MPK section. At that time, the crew accomplished the mission with an excellent grade. And after Nemimushchiy's return from the hospital, Antsiferov told his friend in detail about his observations; he suggested what should receive special attention in organizing combat training.

As the final check showed, the competing crews received approximately the same results in the winter period. Both ships retained the title of outstanding. All course tasks were accomplished by the seamen in a quality manner and with equally high grades. Training firings and firings for record were accomplished with the highest grade. The number of experts and specialists with high ratings grew on both ships. The crew headed by Captain-Lieutenant Antsiferov was declared the winner of the competition. There are more 1st- and 2d-class specialists here (73 percent versus 69 percent) and the organization of shipboard duty is somewhat higher, according to the estimates of the checkers.

But the success of the unit's leading crews could be even more ponderable. Unfortunately, the division's staff seldom summed up the results of the competition and the accomplishment of obligations by the competitors was not analyzed in the proper manner. They explain this situation by the fact that the division commander was on a long cruise. But you see, the division chief of staff, Captain-Lieutenant A. Manantsev, the deputy commander for political affairs, Captain 3d Rank V. Titov, and other officers were left in his place. And they did not have the right to avoid this important matter.

It should be supposed that in the summer training period the attention of the senior commanders in the organization of competition between ships will be intensified and the experience of the unit's leading crews will become a good help in this work.

World War II Submarine Development

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 May 80 p 4

[Article by Rear Adm (Ret) A. Rodianov, candidate of naval sciences: "First-Born of Underwater Cruisers"]

[Text] A strong navy had been created in our country by the start of the Great Patriotic War. Great attention was devoted to the development of submarine forces which, as is known, are the most important component of the state's sea power.

Back at the beginning of the 1930's, Soviet scientists and designers had designed and had built at Soviet shipyards submarines of various designs. Among them were those of the "Dekabrist," "Leninets," "Shchuka," and other types. They were built in series. Improvements of various types were introduced in each subsequent series. The experience which was acquired in the design and construction of these boats permitted beginning the development of submarine ships of the large displacement type--"K" (cruiser). They were intended for the conduct of combat operations in the ocean, at a great distance from their bases. In their tactical and technical elements, these boats were at the level of the latest achievements of world submarine shipbuilding. Their chief designer was M. A. Rudnitskiy.

Submarines of the "K"-type had a surface displacement of 1,720 tons and an underwater displacement of 2,100 tons. Three diesels provided a surface speed of 22 knots (40.7 kilometers per hour) and a cruising range under economical running of up to 15,000 miles (27,800 kilometers). Submerged speed was 10 knots (18.5 kilometers per hour). The armament of these submarines: 10 torpedo tubes (total reserve--24 torpedoes), 20 mines, two 100-mm and two 45-mm guns. Endurance was 45 days with a crew of 72. The submarines were equipped with the latest communication equipment, sonar, and torpedo fire control instruments for that time.

Important theoretical, experimental, and design work preceded and accompanied the creation of these submarines. Industry began the production of diesels with a power of 4,200 hp and powerful electric motors to provide submerged running for them. The outer hull, interior bulkheads, and several other structural elements of a strong hull were made using electrowelding. The calculated reliability of the welded structural elements was completely confirmed when sailing in stormy weather and under combat conditions. A special mine was manufactured for the cruiser submarines whose designer was Engineer-Captain 3d Rank N. G. Fedorov. It could be laid to a depth of 250 meters.

One of the versions of the plan for a submarine, called "KE-9," envisioned the inclusion of a hangar for a reconnaissance seaplane.

But the submarine accepted for construction was the version of a submarine ship with torpedo, mine, and gun armament which was called first the "KR"

and then "K." The pilot K-1 submarine was laid down on 27 December 1936 and launched on 29 April 1938, and it raised the Navy Ensign on 26 May 1940 after comprehensive shakedown and state tests. In the same year, on 6 August the submarine joined the Northern Fleet.

In 1941-1943, it accomplished 12 combat cruises to reconnoiter distant enemy bases and lay mines and engaged enemy ships and transports many times. The submariners destroyed nine fascist ships and transports with a total displacement of 34,835 tons, a mine bumper, and two escorts. On 28 October 1941 a fascist tanker was blown up on mines laid by the K-1. The crew observed the death of the enemy vessel from a short distance. The success filled the submariners' hearts with pride: the fascists could not deliver aviation fuel, which would have been enough to completely refuel 1,500 bombers or 3,000 fighters, at the point of destination.

Not only the K-1, but also other submarines of this type which participated in the war as part of the Northern and Baltic Fleets, operated extremely successfully. The seamen respectfully called them "Katyushas." Numerous sniper-like torpedo and artillery salvos of the cruiser submarines and layings of mines in distant areas of the theater are well known.

Here is how their combat activity was characterized by the famous North Sea Fleet submariner, Hero of the Soviet Union I. Kolyshkin, in his book, "V giubinskakh polyarnykh morey" (In the Depths of Polar Seas): "The 'Katyushas' place minefields on the convoy routes. This is a difficult mission which requires the highest navigational accuracy and absolute secrecy. The entire labor may go to pot with the violation of even one of these conditions. But our ships succeed in observing these conditions completely. And commanders reported many times already concerning fires which were noted in the area where mines were laid. And, as is known, water cannot burn by itself."

The following facts testify to the way the "Katyushas" fought. Of the 10 "K"-type submarines which were part of the Northern and Baltic Fleets during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the title of "Guards" was received by K-22 while K-21 and K-52 became Red Banner submarines.

Nuclear submarines armed with missiles of various types are the main force of today's Soviet Navy. They have high speed when submerged, great submergence depth, and improved radio and sonar equipment and can operate at a great distance from their bases. The submariner seamen, in addition to the glorious traditions of the war heroes, are persistently mastering the most complex combat equipment and are reliably standing guard over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

Amphibious Assault Exercise

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 May 80 p 1

[Article by Capt. Ed. Pank H. Bystrov: "Those Fierce Assaults..."]

[Text] A landing of Northern Fleet personnel took place here, on this sector of the coast, during the Great Patriotic War. The assault from the sea proved to be difficult but victorious. The theoretically indestructible enemy defense could not withstand the pressure of the naval infantry. But now, in these places far from inhabited areas stray mushroom pickers or unexpected tourists find traces of furious skirmishes once in a while.

It was here that the command decided to conduct a training landing of an assault landing force. Each seaman knew what land he would move over in the training assault--over the land of the frontline fighters. Each officer remembered the tactical skill, resolve, and valor possessed by the commanders who led their subordinates in the assault which seemed to be impossible and led them to victory. The leaders of the exercise, in analyzing the experience of the wartime landing, thought about how to make better use in today's training of that which was tested by the fire of war.

Then, the forward detachment, operating swiftly and boldly and on the basis of carefully compiled intelligence data, was able to paralyze the enemy's communications and communication lanes, cause turmoil in his rear areas, and knock out headquarters. And the well-coordinated defense system in essence ceased to be such.

Now, too, in the course of the exercise primary attention was devoted to the forward detachment. Difficult soldierly work was waiting for the battalion which was moving ahead of the main body.

Completing his reconnoitering the battalion commander once again summoned the company commander, Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Khrapunov. Of average height (for the naval infantry), strong and determined, which was felt even in his appearance, he calmly looked the battalion commander in the eye and listened attentively.

"I do not want to charge up the situation," said the lieutenant colonel, "but if the battalion has decisive significance for the main body, your company has it for the forward detachment. Your seamen must show everything, everything which you taught them."

The officer returned to the company. The seamen were resting before beginning to load on the landing ship. They jumped up on seeing the senior lieutenant, but he stopped them with his hand. He sat down a little to the side and his very eyes raced from one naval infantryman to another. "This is probably how it was then, in the war," he thought. "The commanders looked at their fighting men in the same way and tried to guess what each of them will be able to do for victory." His subordinates must be able to do much.

And really, in general they must be able to do very much: to fire any weapon, use any transportation and combat equipment, lay mines, explode, execute long marches, camouflage themselves on any terrain, and win in hand-to-hand combat.

And here, on this exercise, in addition to everything else their ability to use any combat equipment and weapons was checked. They were given armored personnel carriers from another subunit, weapons were to be changed in battle, and the majority in the company were even to experience loading on the ship for the first time.

Loading on the landing ship proceeded ahead of schedule, and the company disembarked just as quickly and dexterously. Using the folds in the terrain, the armored personnel carriers rushed to leave the sea as quickly as possible. The landing ship was ready to support them by fire, but thus far the "enemy" had not detected the company and offered no resistance.

Suddenly, reconnaissance discovered "enemy" tanks. The company commander reasoned: The "enemy" does not expect them here, reconnaissance did not notice them, and this means that secrecy and surprise are on their side. Strike immediately--and forward.

The mounted infantry antitank rocket launchers roared in a salvo. Warrant Officer [praporshchik] G. Zamyshlyak, Senior Seamen A. Danilyuk and V. Zaytsev--no one spoiled the commander's concept. The targets which had been hit, which no longer appeared to be formidable, but helpless, burst into flame. And the company, picking up speed, moved on farther, preparing for new surprises. Senior Lieutenant V. Khrapunov noted in his notebook: "Danilyuk and Zaytsev fired for the first time. Both had a direct hit."

Prior to the naval infantry, Khrapunov served in a motorized infantry unit and also commanded a company. It occupied first place in the battalion and second place in the regiment. In the unit, good prospects opened up for the officer. But then, one day it was recommended to him that he become a naval infantryman--and he knew no peace of mind until he arrived at the new unit, until he saw his new subordinates--so unusual in their black uniforms with the knitted shirts and with anchors on their berets. And here Senior Lieutenant Khrapunov literally felt himself to be a step higher. Also a company, but what even a small subunit of naval infantrymen can do was well shown in 1943 by the detachment of Major Tsezar' Kunikov which seized a beachhead on Malaya Zemlya which has become known to the entire world.

Before the exercise, the company commander told his subordinates about the exploits of the Kunikov men and he read excerpts from the book by L. I. Brezhnev, "Malaya Zemlya."

"Remember this when you go into battle," the officer finished his story. "We have behind us the glory of the older generations, and ahead of us--our own, not yet captured positions."

Khrapunov tried in every way to avoid this open draw, but the situation did not permit him to select another path. The armored personnel carriers had barely crossed half the dangerous sector when the "enemy" struck in the flank.

Contemporary battle is fluid. It may prove to be quite brief for a separate company located in the "enemy's" dispositions.

Khrapunov deployed the platoon of Senior Lieutenant N. Kovalenko instantaneously. The answering fire diminished the "enemy's" ardor. This was enough for the attached mortar subunit to be able to deploy. The mortar rounds rushed above the draw with a howl. And Khrapunov, slipping across the draw with the company, deployed it on a convenient direction and led it into battle.

Of course, in reality this was a range. And to win here meant to "knock down" all the targets in the allotted time.

When the last shot had spread as an echo in the cone-shaped hills the assistant commander of the fleet, Rear Admiral A. Akatov, who had observed the actions of the company did not hold back in the praise he expressed to the battalion commander.

...The company was resting. The seamen were pretty well tired. (For their raid did not end there, on the exercise. It was necessary to cover several kilometers and to get astride a road.) Resting just as everyone, Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Khrapunov was thinking over his report at the forthcoming critique. What had they not yet worked out in proper measure? Perhaps. observation in battle. The subunit commanders did not always control the fire of their subordinates clearly.... And here, Khrapunov understood why he had been singing for a long time: "...He will not forget, will not forget those fierce assaults...." And the seamen are fine fellows. He did not even expect such impulse, enthusiasm and self-sacrifice. No, those fierce assaults of the 1940's will never be forgotten for the Soviet servicemen. They live today, live in each battle where the present generation of the motherland's defenders are learning to be brave, skillful, and steadfast.

Guided Missile Boat Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 May 80 p 2

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Gotovtsev, commander of guided missile patrol boat: "With Consideration of Experience"]

[Text] When you look at the graph which depicts the course of socialist competition on the ship, the conclusion arises at once: "We worked well in the winter period. All obligations were accomplished completely, and this means that the next step forward has been taken in improving combat skill."

Actually, on the whole the crew worked purposefully in the winter. The number of experts and rated specialists grew. We accomplished missile and gunnery fire with high grades. The crew demonstrated outstanding ability in sailing under difficult weather conditions.

Well-organized socialist competition played its role in the matter of increasing the effectiveness of military labor. Each seaman participated in it. All groups and departments competed for the high-quality accomplishment of missions at sea and at anchor at the base. Success was also furthered by the fact that in the majority of the subunits collective and personal obligations were adjusted with consideration of practicable capabilities.

The competition was used especially skillfully to raise the quality of the seamen's combat training and the maintenance of the equipment in the engineer department (BCh-5). According to the results of the winter period, this subunit was named the best in the division of boats. In summing up the results the commander of BCh-5, Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant V. Shepetkov, did not limit himself to a simple listing of the leaders and the laggards but he analyzed the course of the training in detail, accentuated attention on the experience of the best, and disclosed the reasons for shortcomings.

One of the first places on the ship is occupied by the missilemen and gunners commanded by Warrant Officer [midman] V. Balanyuk. He is distinguished by the ability to maintain a spirit of competition among his subordinates and to kindle in the men the striving not to stop at what has been attained but to go from good indices to excellent ones.

However, it must be admitted that the achievements could have been more ponderable if all petty officers, warrant officers, and officers had a thoughtful and creative attitude toward the organization of the competition. For example, the procedure used by the supervisor of the radiometer operators, Warrant Officer N. Kokorin, "limped." As a rule, prior to and during exercises he monitored only his subordinates' accomplishment of those obligations for the maintenance of the materiel. In summing up the results in such cases, he did not consider the behavior of the man, his observance of the daily routine, the uniform, and so forth. And when the ship was anchored at the base, at times he neglected the competition of the seamen for the excellent maintenance of the battle stations.

Many seamen assumed the obligation to work and exceed the standards. But not everyone planned specific goals. For this reason, individual commanders stopped timing the actions of their subordinates, which reduced the effectiveness of the drills. In the summer period, we will adopt measures to eliminate this shortcoming. The appropriate adjustments have been introduced in the personal and collective obligations and the monitoring of drills is being improved.

Some officers underlined mutual assistance on the ship as only the patronage of a strong specialist over one less experienced. But you see, even men with approximately equal qualifications can help one another in some way.

But this point was not considered when organizing competition in some of the collectives. We are now correcting this situation.

The crew of our guided missile patrol boat is competing with the crew headed by Captain 3d Rank V. Dementiyenko. Businesslike contacts are being maintained between the collectives. And nevertheless, acknowledging self-critically I personally and the assistant commander of the ship, Captain-Lieutenant G. Luk'yanenko, did not always analyze the achievements of the rivals with proper attention. We enrich ourselves less than we could with the experience of our friends daily and less deeply. Here we have something to work on in the summer training period since the skillful use of the experience and achievements of the rivals in competition is one of the important reserves for a further rise in the ship's combat readiness.

Naval Infantry Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 80

[Article by Capt 3d Rank V. Polishchuk: "The Naval Infantry Attacks"]

[Text] Under the cover of night, a large landing ship covertly approached the point for landing the naval infantry assault force. Armored personnel carriers and tanks strained for the shore. The strike proved to be a surprise for the "enemy." Building up firepower, the assault troops seized a bridgehead on the coast on the move and captured the nearest populated place.

But this was only the start of the training battle.

A steep-faced coniform hill, looming in the distance in the predawn twilight--this was the main obstacle. A strongly fortified strong point of the "enemy's" defense was located there. The closer the swell of the naval infantry's attack rolled up to this hill, the fiercer became the resistance of the opposing side.

"You could bypass it and strike from the rear," Senior Lieutenant P. Skaletskiy suggested to the commander.

"It is easy to say," the commander studied the map in a concentrated manner. "Here we have both water obstacles and gullies. Will the tanks pass through?"

"But you trust Vasil'yev and me. We will get through."

Senior Lieutenant Skaletskiy did not mention the name of the tank platoon commander, Lieutenant P. Vasil'yev, by chance. This young officer recently arrived from school but already showed himself to be a competent, industrious commander and a reliable person on whom one can count in a difficult situation. He and Skaletskiy are rivals in socialist competition. At first, Skaletskiy, according to the duty of the senior, pulled Vasil'yev up, worked with him additionally on tactics, and helped him to master the art of

controlling subordinates in battle. But in the winter period of training the lieutenant made such a step forward in command training that the rivalry now proceeded virtually on an equal basis....

"Well," said the commander, "if you dare! But remember: much depends on how smoothly you will operate, on how quickly and, most important, how secretly you execute the bypass."

The officers issued the final instructions to their subordinates prior to the start of the enveloping maneuver. The motors turned over dully. The tanks and armored personnel carriers took cover in the dense forest one after the other.

Surprises lay in wait for the young officers at each step. Thus, reconnaissance reported that in addition to natural obstacles it is also necessary to cross contaminated sectors. Junior Sergeants P. Koloskov, D. Nikishkin, and D. Danilov drove the vehicles, coping with all difficulties successfully.

Once, some inaccuracies were observed in the training of the assault force members. The procedure for disembarking from the ship to the shore and seizing a beachhead were worked out in an intensified manner, and then considerably less time was devoted to teaching the naval infantrymen confident actions at the later stages of the battle. Officers Skaletskiy and Vasil'yev, people on the move and creative, were among the first in the unit to focus attention on this problem, and they conducted a search in the procedure which was directed toward a deeper approach toward tactical training and toward all training of the naval infantrymen.

All this had a favorable effect now, when it was necessary to fight not only on the coast, but also in the depth of the enemy's defense.

And here is the line from which it was planned to launch a strike from the rear. The command, "Action," is sounded.

The tank whose crew is commanded by Sergeant N. Mordovtsev is the first to tear for the "enemy" positions. Behind it are the crews of Senior Sergeants P. Kolesnikov and D. Yefimov.... The hill is taken!

Vasil'yev's face sparkles with a joyous smile.

"On combat success!" Skaletskiy congratulates him.

"On the accomplishment of the obligations!" Vasil'yev answers.

Carrier Pilot Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 May 80 p 2

[Article by Capt-Lt A. Tkachev: "Carrier Pilot"]

[Text] The day before, the commander crossed out his name from the flight table it was a sign of attention. Major Glushko was granted the opportunity to spend his birthday in a trouble-free manner.

Prior to his transfer to the cruiser "Kiev," it never would have occurred to Vasilii Glushko to quarrel over such a matter. But as a carrier pilot, he was ready to fight for each flight. Glushko went to the senior commander and defended his right to flights.

It is necessary to present an explanation of this "pugnacity" so as not to distort Glushko's character which is obliging for the most part. At 17 years of age, he was a fourth-class milling machine operator and knew lathe-work and boring. Worker's skill came easy to him. But Vasilii would become careful in answering what he had a liking for. The fact that the world was large enough for the thing to which he would like to devote his life was not even in his dreams. He had double dreams: he mentally aimed now for the flight helmet, now for the naval warrant officer cap.

His selection was decided by a funny incident. An unimproved airfield was located alongside the house where Glushko lived. Vasilii asked if he could see how the agricultural airplanes taxi over the grass, how the pilots have a smoke in the shade.... One day, he dared to walk up to an An-2 which was standing and being refueled. The pilot saw that the lad had an apple and shouted:

"How about a treat, if you're not greedy!"

"And is it too weak to go for a ride?" said the lad, throwing the apple.

"But we are not passenger planes.... Oho! That's an apple! Where did you get the honey apple?"

"Mine."

"Bring a bucket of them and I'll take you for a ride," the pilot joked.

In two weeks one of the apple trees stood almost bare. In return, Vasilii was filled with stunning impressions. He knew (from reference books) the aviation instruments, the young pilot was trusting, and really he was eager to treat him to the "honeys." One way or another, the control stick found itself in the hands of the passenger. At first, on straight legs. Later-- one day-- in a banking turn. The pilot could hardly keep the airplane from turning over.

With this, the "apple" flights ended.

In return, Glushko rushed headlong to the aeroclub and joined it, forgetting about the sea for a long time. Having already become a fighter pilot and flight commander, he remembered. He served in Central Asia, far, far away from the oceans. Glushko's peace was disturbed by conversations; ostensibly we are receiving ships capable of carrying jet aviation. He checked up at once. Later--he took a chance!--he filled out an application. As he wrote, he imagined how the regimental commander would read it and say: "What is this carrier aviation?"

But the regimental commander exclaimed:

"The fourth application! What's going on, did you arrange things? Everybody! Pass the word that no one is to come to me on this question.... Case closed!"

The question of Glushko's transfer remained open for long months. Time tested him. With uncertainty. With expectation. Finally, the temptation with which the regimental commander shattered his resolve: "A vacancy is contemplated--recall the application." Glushko flew over the desert. The stratosphere gave birth to the illusion of ocean waves. But he had only to drop the MIG to low altitudes, and it was as if a roaster had been blown into the cockpit. The sandy waves breathed with a murderous stuffy heat. "Recall the application.... A rejection will come, and the vacancy is gone...."

But the order for his inclusion in carrier aviation arrived all the same.

Flights from the "Kiev" became happiness.... To tell the truth, I wrote this word without vacillation. Glushkov did not use it himself. But it suggested itself, summing up the essence of his phrases. "In flight, I saw a school of dolphins. We became accustomed to their slipping from view beneath the water. And here it was calm, and it was as if they took off under glass, remaining in view. I rocked the wing and thanked them for the pleasure which they gave." "The first storm was frightening--will it make me seasick? The diners in the flight personnel's wardroom thinned out.... I climbed up to the command station and requested permission to be present. And I did not notice that two watch reliefs passed. The stem of the 'Kiev' is high, but the waves burst on the deck and exploded into fountains of spray. I recalled how in Central Asia I could not tear myself away from the television screen when they showed films of seamen. The sky has a single rival--it is the ocean."

But first and foremost, the flights were lessons which Glushko needed in order to prove himself. He arrived on the ship as if with the second wave of pilots which the pilots of the first wave--Vladimir Ratnenko, Nikolay Yedush, and Vladimir Kolisnichenko--put on the wing. They accomplished the pioneer flights above the Atlantic. The experience of these pilots succeeded in being cast in the directive lines of the instructions. The youth, arriving directly from the schools, learned these documents by heart, as axioms.

But Glushko and other pilots with him who had independent experience looked upon them more as theorems which require proof.

The truth was born in flight.

It seemed to Glushko that flight cliches were being pressed on him, and to his commanders it seemed that the newcomer was taking excessive and senseless risks. He was rebuked for "twists and turns" and for "too advanced flying." Resentment prevented him from hearing further, but next it was often noted that young pilots could learn this and that from Glushko, that in such-and-such elements he was better than anyone else. Glushko was entrusted with a most important demonstration of a vertical-takeoff airplane. He accomplished the demonstration flight irreproachably. Something unforeseen occurred on the deck. The leader of the demonstration group recommended that Glushko transfer...to the fighter pilots.

"Of course," he added, "the pro's and con's must be weighed.... As soon as you make up your mind, write me at the address...."

Vasily concealed the address in some documents. If it had not been him, the entire conversation would have seemed to him to be pure fantasy. But the address was written clearly, in another's handwriting.... In no way could it be fantasy. And this forced Glushko to ponder firmly.

He looked at himself strictly, honestly. Yes, he had been able to collect himself for a most difficult assignment, but he could also make a mistake in a simple situation. By way of artist's licence, he could accomplish a "barrel roll" between the crests of the waves--this gave him pleasure although it had no reason. Sometimes, he gave in to caprice or had the blues. How did these weaknesses in the work of the test pilot turn out? Glushko judged his testing work professionally, knowing that its core is discipline and self-discipline.

Glushko considered it better to remain silent about the flattering offer. For the present, he considered, he did not have the right to accept the offer. And he did not want to turn everything into confusion.

Sleeplessness was an unexpected consequence of this offer. The unkind guest visited him strictly at night after flights. Nighttime meditations affected estimates. This is what happened, for example, with the "Glushko pirouette" of which he became proud at first.... Glushko tested his strength in a "sliding" landing. It was often employed by Yedush and by Kolisnichenko. Its essence: the airplane, maintaining low speed, touches the landing deck without hovering and vacates it at once using the inertia of a short run. This lets the next aircraft land more rapidly.... But the pilot requires a Jewellers flying skill.

Glushko decided to stop the airplane (so that it would be beautiful) exactly opposite the command post. He did not have sufficient skill, but Glushko did not linger. Without letting the airplane touch the supports, he swung

it around, using maneuver by means of thrust, and he returned to the planned point.

At night he became ashamed. Well, what acrobatic fluttering did he make? It could have been need, or even because of stubbornness. But what if a gust of wind had been a little stronger? If the airplane had lost stability? In addition, in the landing mode he began to cut back on the revolutions a little late....

He always loved flights, otherwise it is impossible for the pilot. But now, an insatiable thirst for drilling, a thirst for flights was really awakened in him. And when the commander crossed out his name from the table on his birthday on the basis of his better motives, Glushko expressed obstinacy.

The cockpit canopy cut him off from the ship's noise.

"Twenty-three, you are cleared for takeoff," Glushko heard the accustomed voice of the flight control officer, Major Kolisnichenko. Later, this self-possessed officer would shout: "Brakes! Brakes!" (And in a talk he will say to me: "In such situations, it is easier for the pilot than for the flight control officer.") But for the present, he has no grounds for uneasiness: the jet aircraft are taking off beyond the horizon.

Glushko remained satisfied with his first flight. "We worked out the rabbit," he jokingly called to the technician. On the second flight he worked out the pastry (stewed rabbit and pastry--the traditional refreshment for one who is celebrating his name day on the "Kiev.") It remained to return and accomplish the landing.

In addition to Glushko's airplane, there were two more in the air. The weather deteriorated, and the flight control officer began to hurry the pilots to return. Kolisnichenko observed a squall front on the radar--it was impossible for the ship to avoid encountering it.

"Twenty-three, you are cleared for landing."

Glushko occupied the glide path--that invisible but completely real curve along which the airplane rolls down to the deck of the ship from the aerial "mountains." The flight control officer saw through the window of the launch command post that a dot in the sky was swelling up, acquiring the outline of a small airplane. Something alarmed his experienced gaze....

"Twenty-three--check your speed...speed!"

But Glushko was late in correcting his error. The other two airplanes landed normally. Only Glushko and a rescue helicopter which was moving alongside the ship remained in the air. The helicopter crewmen were the first to notice the snow squall which was rushing obliquely toward the cruiser. Nothing remained for them but to request permission to land.

At this moment, Glushko was coming out of a banking turn.... We interrupt the narrative. "It is necessary in order to outline the situation with the detail sufficient for understanding subsequent events. By itself, a squall is not dangerous either for a ship or for an airplane. The pilot can lift the airplane above the storm clouds and wait out the "mess and hell breaking loose" if there is enough fuel. The entire drama of Glushko's situation was that little fuel remained in his airplane's tanks. And landing during a squall is an extremely important stage even on the shore.

The shortland report of the radio traffic:

VF (Flight control officer, Major Kolesnichenko): "23, how much fuel left?"

VF (Major Glushko): "Remainder...." (his voice is calm).

VF: "Understood. We will land."

VF: "Did not understand. Much noise."

VF: "We will land. Approach for landing."

VF: "Roger."

From a talk with Glushko: "Coming out of the banking turn, I did not see the 'Kiev.' Hell had broken loose there and there was rotary motion. The cloud rolled in on me like a bluish mountain. In several seconds, the airplane began to shake in the strong whirlwinds. I wasn't able to be frightened, it was necessary to struggle...."

The now transformed space into an abyss where there was neither bottom nor top.

VF: "Guide me."

VF: "Distance...in a glide."

VF: "Turn on deck lights."

From the talk with Glushko: "I asked them to illuminate the ship in order to see it a little sooner. The airplane continued to shake. I could not reduce speed without the risk of turning over."

Major Kolesnichenko and the landing operator saw the airplane on the smoky-greenish dish of the radar screen as a "firefly" sliding along the web of the degree grid.

VF: "Distance.... Speed!"

VF: "I execute."

From the talk with Glushko: "I tried to reduce the speed, but the shaking became threatening. As a result, I did not see the ship visually."

Off: "Distance... Reduce speed!"

Off: "I am reducing speed."

From the talk with Glushko: "As soon as I reduced the revolutions of the turbines, the airplane 'pitched.' We fell downward and left the glide path. It was necessary to 'push' the turbines."

Off: "Left three! Why don't you reduce speed? Why are you losing altitude?"

Off: (Does not answer).

From the talk with Glushko: "Most important was to restore the course direction. I could miss the mark without it and by now there was not enough fuel for a new approach. I pushed the stick forward and descended.... There was no time to explain."

At about 40 meters he caught sight of the cruiser's wake. He did not reduce speed. His hands were engaged in piloting themselves, as if independent of the pilot's consciousness. Glushko only looked....

Off: 231

A vague sphere flickered in the haze--the "Kiev," lit up by the deck lights, was enclosed within it. Glushko diverted the airplane from the wake "bearing" and, gaining altitude, entered the inner sphere of the vaguely flickering sphere. The tip of the aircraft nose pulled up. He reduced the thrust of the engines, but the speed dropped slower than the aircraft and the ship approached each other.

The ship's radar preserved this landing. In the frame the airplane, blurred by a stream of smoke, emerges as it is moving in an unusual position. The nose is raised. The airplane tosses from wing to wing. As the specialists say, it "parachutes" to the deck. Moving five or six meters past the stern side, the airplane momentarily "pitches" downward, piercing the deck with the front landing gear.

Off: "Brakes! Brakes, 231! Cut off the engines!"

Glushko applied the brakes even without instructions, hearing how the wheels which are losing strands of burning cord and are clamped very firmly squeal.

The airplane stops. They run up to it....

At night, Glushko walked about the cabin. His shoulders, which his comrades slapped with all their might with joy, ached. The overexcitement which he had experienced during the day slept. His memory returned him to the stern sky. It was bitter, and there was pride. He reached the familiar address and twisted about now and then....

On that day, he was 24. Chkalov joined the test pilots at 26....

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330: 1431

TULA ARTILLERY SCHOOL ACTIVITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 80 p 2

[Article by General Lieutenant of Artillery V. Kulev, Chief of the Tula Artillery School: "Imeni the Tula Proletariat"]

[Text] Every day letters arrive at the Tula Order of Lenin and the October Revolution Higher Artillery Engineering School imeni the Tula Proletariat from all corners of the country. Most of them, of course, are from high school seniors. This is readily understandable. Youths who have decided to join the army are interested in many things. For example, they ask why there must be engineers in the artillery. I generally read from these letters during talks with students who are in their final year at the school. Some of them asked the same questions when they were younger but now it makes them smile--how, they say, can it be otherwise.

Really, it is impossible to be otherwise today. Today's artillery officer is a specialist of the highest technical skills. Such is the requirement of today's level of combat equipment development and military science. The students are already convinced of this in the first days of training. They arrive with conviction at an interest in the successful mastery of their chosen specialty, and a feeling of responsibility and pride in belonging to the ranks of students of such a glorious military training institution as ours.

The letters of the students themselves testify to this. The first-year student A. Popov, for example, is saving the letter written to him last year by the Lenin grant-aided student A. Shcherbina--"I am proud to be studying at one of the oldest military schools,"--the senior wrote--"it was created a way back in 1919 on the site of the Tula Armored School and for 60 years it has trained thousands of officers who have brought fame to the school on the battlefields of the Civil War and World War II. Each of us remembers and, if necessary, is ready to repeat the battle deeds of the heroes of the Soviet Union Colonel V. Gavrilov, Major I. Yedunov, and many others. It is not even possible today to compare our school to what it was 60 or 20 years ago."

To go a step further, it is difficult to compare the changes which have taken place with us in the past decade. This is natural. The missile, rocket, and artillery weapons of our army are constantly being improved and equipped with new instruments and devices. The troops are employing, to an even greater degree, cybernetics and electronics which permit the most precise calculations to be made within a few seconds, to issue the necessary data for launches and firings, to analyze, compare, and make decisions. All of this is in the training programs of the school. The future artillerymen are studying higher mathematics, physics, theoretical mechanics, are becoming acquainted with automatic guidance systems, are studying to set up and operate computers, and to program combat training problems on them.

This is being done with one aim--to train highly-skilled artillery engineers capable, under the complex conditions of modern war, to assure that the maximum technical potential of arms and equipment are being used.

A fine supply of training equipment will allow the young officers to master in depth the necessary theoretical knowledge and practical skills. There is a highly-skilled teaching staff at the school. The planning of training has been built thoughtfully, and the basic method of instruction is clearly maintained--from the simple to the complicated, thereby allowing the potential of each student to be considered.

Recently I observed the work of the student F. Kuz'min on the computer. He computed and independently prepared for the machine the third program in succession, although he still has more than a year before graduation. The teachers already believe today that he will be a very promising military electronic engineer. The department also gave the same evaluation to the final year student V. Oleynik who is writing a graduation thesis on an actual troop theme.

There is no doubt that these student successes are not accidental. The department is conducting a great deal of purposeful work on training the young specialists in deep professional knowledge and skills. The use of the most modern technical instructional methods is of invaluable assistance to the instructors in this. For example, a computer is widely used for student lessons. It gives out problems, analyzes answers, formulates additional questions, and assesses the knowledge both of each student and of the group as a whole. Such a training practice forms in the future engineering officer a conciseness and precision of decisions, speed in evaluations and conclusions, and the ability to anticipate and to think creatively.

The department headed by Doctor of Technical Sciences Colonel of Engineers V. Melititskiy has also used many promising teaching innovations. A majority of the training themes and lessons are worked out here in a total-approach fashion. The necessary level of theoretical and practical unity has been achieved because of the large number of auditoria with modern electronic devices and the provision of lessons with combat

equipment operating assemblies and units. For example, students conducting the most complex radar operations confirm their practical actions with theoretical calculations, diagrams, and charts which reflect the processes occurring in combat equipment.

Other departments are also making wide use of the most modern technical aids for training, direction, and information. For example, in the auditoria and training classrooms of the department headed by Candidate of Technical Sciences assistant professor Colonel of Engineers G. Kuprin, the training instructor can demonstrate a specific combat equipment assembly or weapon without leaving the premises. For this he only has to switch on a television set and the transmitting television cameras which are placed in the equipment hall and in the training center.

As an aside, both the training center and the training and repair facility of the school answer the strictest demands. Today's military engineer is born and thoroughly tempered under conditions which very closely approximate real ones. Therefore the practical field exercises have special importance for the future officers.

The practical training of the students has been well thought out. As a rule, it consists of several stages. The future officers work in both the school's production training workshop and in the repair organs. They work on probation among the troops only after this. Such a sequence forms within the future artillery engineers solid skills in equipment repair and replacement work, permits the study to perfection of the complex processes occurring in it, and the acquisition of scientific forecasting experience for combat use. The military scientific society established at the school, to which almost all of the trainees belong, helps in this. Recently I participated in the work of a conference sponsored by this society. The student Ye. Nadezhkin delivered a report. His work produced a most favorable impression by its depth of development and relevance of the problem. It is no accident that it was presented to the all-army competition.

However, in spite of what combat equipment and the systems directing and maintaining it may accomplish, the individual plays the decisive role in the effective use of artillery systems. That is why the school pays a lot of attention to improving the total political and military training system of the students. The individual with his nature, inclinations, and habits is at the center of attention here. One knows how difficult it is to train a good engineer. However, it is no easier to educate an active political soldier, to temper him ideologically, to teach him an approach toward the understanding of the fundamental processes from a Marxist-Leninist position.

Solid skills in this are based on the great living and service experience of the chief of the political section of the school Colonel A. Shvetsov, the head of the Marxism-Leninism department Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Colonel N. Kaprov, Candidate of Psychological Sciences Colonel A. Andriashkin, Candidate of Technical Sciences Colonel of Engineers K. Salukvadze, Colonel A. Shovkalyuk, and others.

The skillfully arranged political and educational work, the purposeful activities of the party organizations, and the clearly attuned training inspire a great deal of student training and service activity.

One could recite even many more names of officers and students of the school, and talk about their good deeds. Our entire military collective is powerful with solidarity, singlemindedness, and unity. Our former student and now Lieutenant A. Shcherbina was correct when he wrote in his letter that the school educated and tempered him, made him a specialist, and trained him for any difficult trials in life.

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COMBAT TRAINING IN THE GSFG

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 May 80 p 2

[Article: "On a Course toward Quality"]

[Text] GSFG personnel have entered the summer training period in a military frame of mind and with high patriotic enthusiasm. In the training classes and firing courses, at the firing ranges, tank training areas, and airfields the struggle has opened for the exemplary development of the combat training tasks, the bettering of norms, and the effective utilization of each training minute. At the request of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, the first deputy commander-in-chief of GSFG, General Lieutenant V. Gordiyenko talks about the work preceding the beginning of the summer training period.

The following fact testifies to the political and work activity of the personnel and their desire to carry out fully, with a high degree of quality, the plans and programs of the summer training period and their socialist commitments. The number of units struggling for the title of "outstanding" has increased noticeably. The movement toward "foremost" combined unit has been widely disseminated.

The attainment of new outer limits in competition must be maintained organizationally. The thorough preparation for the summer combat training has meant much. The units have completed the planning of combat and political training and instructional demonstrations and instructional methods exercises have taken place with various categories of commanders. Weapons and combat equipment have been solemnly entrusted to the young soldiers of the subunits.

Leadership conferences, devoted to the results of the winter training period, have taken place in a business-like atmosphere. The necessary lessons have been learned from these reviews. Ways to eliminate the shortcomings discovered, and to increase the quality of exercises and the effectiveness of socialist competition have been outlined. The summer training tasks have been discussed at officer meetings in each of the regiments.

Officers of the Group staff and directorates, the combined unit and unit staffs, and the political organs, have worked fruitfully before the beginning of the training period. They have helped the commanders to man the subunits, to prepare an exercise training equipment and stores base, and to take organizational-political and instructional training measures.

The servicemen at the troop firing ranges, tank moving target gunnery ranges, and tactical training areas have worked quickly and well. There has been a great amount of work done to improve their equipment. However, all of the exercise training projects are ready. The most favorable conditions for effective combat training have been created, as for example, in the training center headed by Colonel Yu. Skiyarov. The training base of the regiments has become more reliable and precise. Looks look renewed in the Proskurovskiy Motorized Rifle Regiment. A tactical training area, a forward observer area, a firing range, and an armor range have appeared. These objects permit the creation at the exercises of a complex situation approaching real life.

The units have applied much effort to the creation of a training base necessary for officer training.

The innovators and inventors have contributed significantly to the development of a training equipment and stores base. For example, several suggestions have come about through the efforts of Colonel V. Ivanov, Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers V. Matveyev, Major I. Volosovich, Warrant Officer (praporshchik) B. Kaplych. A simulator for a BMP/infantry combat vehicle operator, a general-purpose simulator for a tank gunner, and a television simulator for driver mechanics, created by innovators, have received wide dissemination.

The emphasis, as has already been noted, is on a further improvement in the quality and effectiveness of training. We are striving to ensure the regular conduct of instructional demonstrations and instructional methods exercises, and to place exercise preparation under strict control.

The commander-in-chief of GSFG, General of the Army Ye. Ivanovskiy, inspected the quality of summer training preparations in the Chertkovskiy Guards Tank Regiment imeni Marshal of Armored Troops M. Ye. Katukov. This unit is a pioneer of socialist competition in GSFG. The commander-in-chief attended a political lesson in one of the subunits, pointed the personnel toward a further increase in combat readiness and field training standards, and a persistent mastery of equipment and weapons.

The unit commanders, their deputies, the chiefs of arms and services, and the staff and political organ workers are being widely drawn into the conduct of the first exercises in the summer training period. The road toward high training effectiveness assumes the use of advanced methods, and the creative and responsible labor of each officer.

MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 May 80 p 2

[Article by Major Ye. Boshko of the Moscow Military District: "A Formula for Economy"]

[Text] I read with interest the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA article by Guards Colonel of Engineers A. Anashechev "An Engineering Solution." Its statement that some people consider the use of scientific methods in the military to be a prerogative only of special centers, training institutions, etc. compelled me to take pen in hand because it must be noted that such opinions are not isolated. They also existed in the unit where I worked recently. They existed and had very appreciable consequences--unjustified losses of material resources, fuel, and electric power.

I was told about the two-year old conversation, instigated by the political worker V. Konstantinov, which took place at a meeting of the party bureau. The fact was that the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant S. Tarasov had not paid proper attention to fuel economy, and the necessary accountability for its expenditure was not established. The attitude of the company commander toward questions of economy was surprising, as if it were something minor. A careful investigation of the situation showed that the exposed shortcomings happened not at all because of a decrease in the officer's exacting attitude toward himself and his subordinates, and not from a loss of party qualities. He simply did not know how to organize work in a scientific manner. So they then told him: "You need a scientific approach here." Tarasov only shrugged his shoulders in reply; what kind of science can there be here? They worked thoroughly with the officer and gave him concrete recommendations. Running ahead, I will say, that today the company has a firm grasp on first place in the unit according to the results of socialist competition.

However, let us go back to the talk at the party bureau. Why do some people feel that one can manage without science when carrying out such a simple task as, let us say, freight shipments? Indeed--"we are required to transport 1,000 tons of gasoline from point A to point B. There are four roads situated between points A and B--the length of the first..."

This would be like a job for a second-rate person. What if you ask the question this way--how do you select the optimum route? You have to consider this question thoroughly. The fact is that the notion of "optimum" requires the obligatory addition of "by what criteria." The shortest route is not always the best from the point of view of conserving motor capacity(broken road bed), the fastest does not always provide maximum fuel economy, etc. Besides that, different criteria can acquire the main importance in different situations. Sometimes it is most important to save fuel(even at the expense of unnecessary minutes added to the trip), and sometimes, on the other hand, the main thing is to arrive at the destination in the shortest period of time, without considering fuel losses.

Why am I writing about this in such detail? I do this because problems had to be solved in just such a way in the unit of which I speak. This unit had, among other things, the job of supplying various projects with fuel, expendable materials, etc. Here, it goes without saying, problems arose over providing the most economical expenditure of fuel during transport operations. When initiative was born and joined the movement under the slogan "to look after the great and the small, to be zealous masters in our collective," the unit increased its attention to the appropriate calculations.

They began with the selection of criteria, which they intended to use to optimize the transport system. Then, in accordance with the results of scheduled trips, they put together drivers' trip tickets with exact run instructions for each of the routes, the expenditure of fuel on them, the time spent on the way to the projects. They summarized the study materials. Since fuel economy is an extremely important criterion at the present time, the most economical routes were recommended to the drivers. A strict control on their observance was set up. We did not have long to wait for the results. There are now dozens of tons of saved fuel on the personal account alone of the drivers of the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant S. Tarasov.

One can save not only on transportation. Captain L. Voronka, for example, developed and introduced pumps for pumping fuel with an electric motor drive which replaced the pump with a gasoline engine. They saved fuel, but what about electric power? The innovator settled this question beforehand by carefully calculating the costs under both cases.

I would like to note yet another thing. We often talk about the necessity for each officer to have a broad scientific and technical outlook. However, we picture it most often of all as speculative, without a concrete result. Actually the scientific and technical competency must be of real use. Experience also prevails in this.

Earlier the storage batteries were simply written off in the unit after they operated for their calculated time periods. However, such an approach to business was truly shown to be mismanagement to specialists who knew the cost of silver and lead and the technology which had been devised

to recover these metals from batteries. Now valuable metals, up to one gram, are being reprocessed. These grams amount to many kilograms during the year. One can say the same thing about the regeneration of spent chemicals. Now they are not poured off as waste products but the valuable components are isolated instead. However, in order to achieve this, it was necessary not only to possess an economic bent but also specific knowledge of chemical engineering.

Judge whether one may speak about a scientific approach to questions of economy. I will add that thanks to such an approach on the economy of material resources, the subunit I am talking about has a firm grasp on first place among the airmen of the district.

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POLITICAL TRAINING IN KIEV MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 May 80 p 2

[Article by General Colonel V. Dement'yev, member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Kiev Military District: "Through the Consciousness of People"]

[Text] The tankers joined battle after a lengthy march. The subunits delivered surprise strikes from various directions, seized strong points on the flanks, and actively maneuvered. All of the combat training tasks which had been set were executed successfully. The professional skill and tactical maturity of the officers and the fine training of the personnel became especially apparent under these complex field conditions. However, another very essential factor also ensured success. I have in mind the quality of the combat equipment preparation. The situation during the exercise was not easy; there was slush and bad roads. However, making bold, and at times, almost risky decisions, the commanders were convinced that the combat vehicles would not let them down.

Such a confidence was inspired first of all by that difficult and tedious work that was done during the period when the equipment was serviced and prepared for the exercise. I want to take note here of the large contribution which the party organizations and unit communists made in mobilizing the servicemen for a qualitative, and I would say, loving maintenance of equipment and weapons. We can clearly see how the party committee of this collective, using methods of political influence, instills in the people a feeling of high responsibility for the correct and competent fulfillment of their obligations, and the observance of the requirements of operational and technical documentation. That is, the role of the party organization comes out in the way that it skillfully forms within the soldiers a desire to perfectly master equipment, to treat it with care, and to show intolerance toward any evidence of negligence in its maintenance or operation.

The regiment conducts meetings between veterans and youngsters. They demonstrate how formidable combat equipment is in skilled, considerate hands by using examples from the history of the unit and of the armored troops. Technical groups, headed by party activists, operate on a regular basis in

the subunits. I will cite Warrant Officer (praporshchik) A. Bratchin, the secretary of the company party organization. He is a first-class specialist who tries to conduct each lesson in the group so that it will have educational importance. The communists in the company learn from their secretary and have an influence literally on each soldier in the subunit.

Party committee meetings systematically examine questions on the maintenance and operation of equipment and weapons. A characteristic here is that there is a firm rule to carry every well-planned thing through to its conclusion. If it was decided to conduct a technical conference in the unit on the day before tactical exercises, then it would certainly take place. Party committee members, who are responsible for one or another work sector, unfailingly control the quality of the technical quizzes and the question and answer nights that have been prepared in the companies, and whether training films are being shown. They check, and if necessary, help. This results in the creation of a responsible attitude toward the work in the subunits.

However, one will encounter cases where people underestimate the rich resources of the party organization in increasing the technical training of the soldiers, in forming a personal responsibility in them for the maintenance of equipment in exemplary condition and in constant combat readiness. Sometimes comrades who are reproached for neglect in maintaining tanks, BMP [infantry combat vehicles], and weapons, justify themselves thusly: you will not correct things, they say, by discussions and accounts at a bureau meeting; material and technical maintenance is required. What is right, is right--you will not achieve much without a high quality material base. However, it must not be forgotten that the solution of these problems depends on people, on their level of consciousness. Therefore one must continually think about the effectiveness of the impact on a person. One would think, as a self-evident truth, that forgetting it leads to tangible losses.

Recently I visited a regiment where one of the best combat vehicle motor pools in the district had been created. The equipment maintenance and operation was poorly organized. Is this a paradox? No, but here again all things hinge on people. Many of them evidently did not have the desire to improve the situation. The secretary of the party committee was puzzled. Their plans covered everything--technical conferences and quizzes were provided, there were meetings between the youths and highly-skilled specialists, there was an exchange of know-how among the officers. Yes, outwardly everything looked faultless. However, the whole trouble was that much that had been planned remained only on paper.

The party committee may and must have a lot to say here. It must demand that communists conscientiously fulfill party assignments and service responsibilities. It must correct the situation at other parts of the educational process. Let us consider the management of socialist competition. Its results are seldom reviewed in the collective. Meanwhile,

both the individual and collective obligations contain a pattern about the knowledge and maintenance of equipment. How is the soldier, crew, platoon, or company fulfilling this during the week or month, what is the situation in increasing class skills, where is the maintenance of tanks and other arms better or worse? These questions are only incidentally raised at criticisms which, in turn, are conducted from case to case. The following example eloquently demonstrates how this changes in practice.

The battalion where Captain V. Zholubitskiy is deputy commander for political affairs participated in a tactical exercise. The personnel performed well and earned the praise of the senior chief. However, the tankers did not put the equipment in order when they returned from the field. When an investigation was conducted on what had happened, one of the officers alleged that the vehicles were only training ones. These communist officers acted as though it never occurred to them what lessons of neglect they gave to their subordinates and what moral losses they inflicted on the collective.

I want to stress this notion. Formalism, a superficial approach in one area of work is often also displayed in another. Take, for example, this situation. The various units arrange servicing days with great pomp. Music blares from the loudspeaker, transparencies glow on the walls of the work bays, why not? This is not bad in principle. However, when the main steps of turn out that the day was unproductive. You ask the organizers of the agitational work what they know about complex and specialized teams because the unit is feebly introducing progressive forms of equipment maintenance and you get the answer: we do not know, we have not heard.

Creative skill and the knowledge to use forms of party influence on the consciousness of people, to foster in them a thoughtful attitude toward equipment, is not come of themselves. Not all members of the party bureau and party committees perform this work. Often the deputy commanders for technical affairs are chosen as the secretaries of the battalion party organizations. One would think that they should know. However, it sometimes happens that the secretary comes across not really as a propagandist and party organizer but as an exceptional technical specialist who "puts pressure" on his subordinates--the technicians of the companies. Of course, the effect of party influence is not great here.

A similar situation also arises in some party staff organizations. I will give an example. Captain V. Tyrtalov, chief of armored service, heads the party organization of a regimental staff. It was reasonable to suppose that under his influence the communists would become closer to their equipment. However, the opposite happened. The over-all rating of the regiment was lowered precisely because of serious neglect in the maintenance and servicing of materiel.

The question naturally arises here--who has been called upon to help the secretary, the other comrades, to arm them with the know-how to mobilize the troops in the struggle for the exemplary operation of materiel, and to teach efficiency? The party committee and the political section deserve reproach in this area. It is strange that the workers of the political organ, after the above-mentioned inspection, when the unit's over-all rating was lowered, never dropped in here. They pleaded that they were busy. I know very well that there are experienced comrades in the political organ--lieutenant colonels Yu. Mezin, V. Nerodyuk, and other officers. If they so wished, they could see much, anticipate, and what is especially important, help the party activists to correct the state of affairs at such an important and responsible sector, and see how the operation and upkeep of combat equipment was going. However, the comrades, to put it bluntly, separated themselves from the troubles of the administrative party organization.

I think that here we see the mistaken opinion existing among some political workers that a tank, BMP, artillery gun emplacement, or motor vehicle must be of concern only to the officers of the appropriate technical services. As a result, we are suffering appreciable losses in the battle for the high quality of equipment maintenance, and the creation of an "uncomfortable" moral climate for careless people.

I have consciously concentrated attention mainly on the deficiencies, and the typical errors and causes behind them. Of course, one can cite many more cases on the other side. As a rule, the party organizations of the subunits and units as well as the workers of our political organs very well understand that the qualitative maintenance and operation of modern combat equipment and weapons require the coordinated efforts of commanders, political workers, the engineering and technical staff, and the party and Komsomol activists. Many party organizations are creatively mastering the progressive practice of instilling within the servicemen a feeling of responsibility for the skillful ownership and careful use of the weapons which the nation has entrusted to them. They understand that a concern for equipment is a party and governmental matter.

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CSO: 1801

PHYSICAL TRAINING IN AN ARTILLERY BATTALION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 80 p 4

[Article by Major V. Pykanov, commander of an artillery battalion in GSFG:
"An Important Reserve"]

[Text] A recent exercise took place under complex tactical conditions. The artillery personnel of our battalion supported the advancing tank and motorized rifle subunits in the rapidly-changing situation of a modern battle. The scenarios followed one after the other and, during a short period of time, the batteries had to occupy new fire positions several times, constantly changing the direction and range of fire. If you also consider that they had to operate in the spring slush, then it will become clear--the personnel require not only skill in conducting fire and a high standard of field training, but also a large amount of enviable physical preparedness.

Our battalion carries the title "outstanding." It rightly bears this title. However, an analysis of the results of the last training year has shown that the outstanding ones still have unused reserves.

Earlier the battalion was the firm champion of the mass sports events held among the related subunits of the combined unit. However, it must be confessed, victories and scores at competitions are achieved basically by one and the same servicemen--the best sportsmen. The bulk of the artillery personnel, it must be acknowledged, have satisfied the so-called average level of physical development. Once in a while such a disproportion has had a negative influence on the course of combat training, especially under field conditions.

Unfortunately, not all officers could always serve as examples to their subordinates by their training and their personal physical hardening. At the beginning of the present training year I and a member of the unit sports committee Captain L. Chegrintsov decided to correct this very shortcoming. The personal plans for increasing the physical preparedness of the officers and warrant officers (praporshchiki) were examined, and competition was organized among them for the mastery of high sports ratings. Senior Lieutenant A. Turayev, a first-class individual in the

military triathlon decided, as an example, to also achieve first class status in the three-kilometer cross-country race. Senior Lieutenant V. Belyayev set for himself the goal of raising the ceiling of his achievements in firing and grenade throwing.

Both of them, by the way, have already attained what they planned in their competitions. The personal sports results of Captain Z. Gromov and lieutenants N. Yeliseyev and V. Shenderuk have increased significantly.

I will say without exaggeration--our sports area has not been quiet recently. Here there are not only training exercises but also regular additional practices with the slower personnel, and competitions between batteries, platoons, crews, and squads. We are also trying to use the time allotted to move to the exercise areas to the maximum extent possible--we conduct short forced marches and exercises along the way.

The further improvement in planning training time has substantially increased the effectiveness of physical training. Physical training exercises were conducted earlier, as a rule, when the fatigue of the training day had already set in or in the morning, almost immediately after morning exercises. This clearly lowered the quality of the lessons. It was decided to plan physical training from 1100-1200 in the morning.

The results of the work are already known. However, we are well aware that everything has not been done. Here is one case. When it became clear that the recent graduates of the training subunits Junior Sergeants V. Maksimov and V. Kamyshnikov could not direct exercises with their subordinates because of their weak personal physical preparedness, we found, as we now understand, far from the best way out of the situation which had been created--we relieved these sergeants of the conduct of the exercises. We could and should have, without losing time, given them the necessary help with their complicated problem. This can be done by passing on the know-how of our best NCO's N. Protasov, B. Tazabayev, and others whose successes we are propagandizing while we have not always been giving appreciable help to the laggards.

In short, the best way to improve the hardening of servicemen is by fully utilizing all of the ways and means of physical training, and by the clear and most effective use of the training time and hours set aside for mass sports work.

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